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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 1.1. The contemporary relevance of enterprise unionism 
Within a development perspective, the importance of unionism and 
enterprise-level bargaining has recently been recognized by the 
leading international development organization, the World Bank 
(WB). Rejecting repressive labour policies of the past, the WB 
states: 
 
  "Denial of workers' rights is not necessary to 
achieve growth of incomes. It is possible to identify the 
conditions and policies under which trade unions can advance 
rather than impede development. Unions are likely to have 
positive effects on efficiency and equity, and their potential 
negative effects are likely to be minimized, when they operate 
in an environment in which product markets are competitive, 
collective bargaining occurs at the enterprise or the plant 
level, and labour laws protect the right of individual workers 
to join the union of their choosing, or none at all." (WB 1995 
p. 85). 
 
Although this statement is a landmark by an organization which 
advocated liberal 'supply side' economics during the 1980s it 
does not take the argument to its logical conclusion, advising 
workers to joint unions constituted at the enterprise level, 
i.e. enterprise unions. The WB report does not differentiate 
between various types of union organizations, presuming that it 
does not matter at all. The WB's shift to an institutional 
economic perspective on development is rather embryonic though. 
  
 
The reluctance to deal with the issue may be part of a more 
general ambiguity against non-Western institutional solutions to 
problems of economic and social development. Thus, the 
'development state' approach by Japanese politicians, 
bureaucrats and economists has not been adopted by the WB in 
spite of the tremendous economic and industrial achievements 
gained by East Asian 'development states' (WB 1993; Moore 1993; 
Wade 1994).   
 
An important part of the Japanese labour market, enterprise 
unions have never been recognized as effective labour 
organizations in the West. The negative judgement, made by 
Galenson & Odaka (1976) twenty years ago, is still the 
mainstream valuation in the West:  
 
  "...because of economic and political weakness, the 
Japanese labour movement has been unable to secure for its 
members a level of social welfare or a degree of industrial 
democracy consistent with the national level of development. 
  It is our view (...) that movement toward a Western 
labour market model is optimal for the future social stability 
of Japan. (...) 
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  If there is to be a fundamental change in the 
Japanese system, the first requisite is the transformation of 
the labour movement from its enterprise base to a national 
structure" (Galenson & Odaka 1976 pp. 669-670). 
 
At the same time Galenson & Odaka (1976) generalized the 
argument in favour of an evolutionary, convergence perspective 
on enterprise unionism:  
 
  "Enterprise unions often exist in less developed 
countries, representing a more primitive type of union 
structure, a transitional stage between loose, preunion 
associations within the single factory and multiemployer unions 
proper. Vulnerable to employer pressure, the single-enterprise 
unions eventually band together not only for mutually aid and 
protection, but also to regulate wage competition within the 
industry or craft" (Galenson & Odaka 1976 p. 630-631). 
 
Twenty years later, the argument for Western-oriented 
convergence withers, countered by substantial evidence on the 
continued divergency of industrial relation systems (Poole 1986; 
Freeman 1989) or the 'reverse convergency' towards Japanese 
features of successful productive and work organizations, coined 
in terms like 'lean production' and 'Japanization' (Womack et al 
1990; Elgar & Smith 1994; Morris & Wilkinson 1995).  
 
The need for reconsidering enterprise unionism (Shirai & Shimada 
1978; Deutschmann 1984; Wad 1988; Jacoby & Verma 1992) is today 
reinforced by the global trend towards decentralization of 
decision-making within bigger transnational and national 
corporations (Gutcher-Gershenfeld & Verma 1994; Clark 1995). 
While the actual decentralization of collective bargaining may 
vary from country to country (with exceptions of increased 
centralization; Locke & Thelen 1995), the enterprise and plant 
level gain increasing significance in strategic economic and 
human resource management thinking.  
 
Contrary to the overall and persistently negative stance against 
enterprise unions in the West, leading politicians from East 
Asian market economies have been advocating 'in-house unions', 
at least since the 1980s. In several East Asian industrializing 
economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand) 
enterprise unions are dominant or important labour organizations 
(Frenkel 1993 p.311), and the political prioritization of high-
tech sectors further "encourages the growth of company 
paternalism and enterprise unionism as work force stabilization 
and enterprise loyalty assume increasing importance", according 
to Frenkel (1993 p.14). The perception of enterprise unionism 
varies anyway among these countries, with Malaysia promoting 
'in-house unions' and Thailand prohibiting them in the public 
sector.  
 
Acknowledging the two facts, first, that the "Next Frontier for 
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Trade Unions" (MacShane 1992) might be located in the rapid 
industrializing region of Asia-Pacific, and, second, that 
collective bargaining at the enterprise level is becoming 
increasingly appropriate in modern industry, it is urgent to 
critically reflect on the Western stereotype of enterprise 
unionism. The provocative question is whether the 'backwardness' 
of enterprise unionism is turning into advantages reaped by East 
Asian actors adopting an organizational framework which might be 
more appropriate for the contemporary and future requirements of 
global competitiveness and social prosperity? The 'advantages of 
backwardness' (Gerschenkron's old dictum) might recur in the 
field of labour market institutions.  
 
 
1.2. Purpose, problem area and method of the argument  
The paper aims to analyse theory and evidence on enterprise 
unionism in order to 'get the argument right' about this type of 
labour organization perceived as alien, notoriously weak and 
'yellow' by Western actors of industrial relations (trade 
unions, employers associations and state labour agencies) (note 
1).  
 
Galenson & Odaka's negative judgement is based on a simple 
theory of unionism and the advancement of labour interests: 
 
Figure 1: Galenson & Odaka's model of union development 
 
       Level of econo- Union  Union  Wage coordi-  
       mic development structure strength nation 
 
 
           Employers' pressure 
 
 
Reconsidering the argument of Galenson & Odaka three revisions 
are required: 
 
  * a broader contextual divergency of economic 
development as they primarily stick to the experiences of the 
USA and Japan;  
  * a more elaborated analysis of enterprise union 
structure and strength; 
  * a more differentiated assessment of the 
intentional and unintentional consequences (effect and impact) 
of enterprise unionism. 
 
Besides reviewing new theory and evidence about USA and Japan, 
we need to address the experiences with enterprise unions in 
developing countries questioning whether enterprise unions are 
that weak as they state? Acknowledging the divergent cultural 
environments and paths of development of Southern countries 
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during the last twenty years, it is of utmost interest to study 
enterprise unions during rapid economic growth and 
industrialization, i.e. selecting cases of the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (NICs).  
 
The structure-and-strength nexus is a complex relationship. One 
aspect is the position of the particular union types within the 
overall trade union movement. Enterprise unions might form a 
minority or a majority of unions in terms of number of 
organizations as well as membership. Enterprise unions never 
dominated the industrial relation scene in the USA as they did 
and still do in Japan. The same disparity must be taken into the 
analysis of enterprise unions in development countries.  
Acknowledging labour organizations as actors which purposely 
influence their own performance and context, we need an 
understanding of the cognition of labour development and the 
specification of the 'union development effect'. Without 
particularizing the content of labour development, we may 
formulate a simple typology of outcomes, serving as a first 
yardstick of 'labour development'. This classification must 
acknowledge the dialectics of labour development, i.e. that 
labour and capital are the counterparts of production, 
generating a dynamic relationship of cooperation and conflict 
during production and distribution. Moreover, it is understood 
as a potential 'plus-sum' game, not necessary a 'zero-sum' or a 
'minus-sum' struggle. Both parties may win, loose or keep status 
quo relative to their former achievements, depending on the 
outcome and distribution of the production process. 
 
The number of outcomes will increase if we acknowledge that the 
outcomes can be defined at several levels: the enterprise 
(micro) level, the industry (mezo) level and societal (macro) 
level; and in a time perspective: the short and the long term. 
 
Addressing unionism and labour market flexibility in a 
development context (Malaysia 1988) Standing (1991, 1992) argues 
that the perspective of 'dynamic efficiency' of unionism should 
have highest priority at the agenda of labour market policies 
for industrializing countries, not the consideration for low 
wage competitiveness or reduction of labour cost per se.  
 
'Dynamic efficiency' is understood as the process whereby unions 
pressure "enterprises to pay efficiency wages rather than 
'market clearing' wages" and induces "management to raise 
productivity by technological innovations and cost-saving 
practices rather than reliance on low paid labour" (Standing 
1992 p.327). The term therefore describes the win-win course of 
labour-capital relationship. Standing also delimits 'dynamic 
efficiency' to the enterprise level in the short term 
perspective (2 years).  
 
Following Standing, the 'dynamic efficiency' approach is the 
contrast to the supply side perspective on unionism implying 
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that "unions raise costs, impose rigidity and are a threat to 
management, so deterring foreign investment", justifying "anti-
union legislation and their blatant suppression in many low-
income countries, and most of all to justify denial of union 
recognition in firms operating in export processing zones". This 
understanding delineates the 'labour loses-capital wins' 
process, at least in the short run at the enterprise level. 
 
In sum, Standing outlines a positive and a negative scenario for 
labour, where the positive scenario is based on concomitant 
business prosperity: the pie is growing and both parties 
benefit. In fact, Standing's categorization is a simplified 
typology of our more elaborated typology (table 1 below). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Outcomes of capital-labour interdependent practices  
 
 
 
 
 
LABOUR 
  CAPITAL 
  WIN SAME LOSE 
 WIN 1. Dynamic 
efficiency 
2. 3. Labour 
effectiveness 
 SAME 4. 5. 6. 
 LOSE 7. Business 
effectiveness 
8. 9. Dynamic 
inefficiency 
 
 
The debate on industrial reorganization and employment 
generation in the industrial West concerns, among other things, 
the core problem of gaining flexibility to counteract the 
increased competition from especially the East Asian economies.  
 
At the micro level, flexibility can be improved along four lines 
(Locke & Thelen 1995 p 341; Locke et.al. 1995 p.142): Work 
reorganization; new compensation schemes; human resource 
development; internal and external labour mobility.  
 
The requirements for increased flexibility are met by various 
strategies. Kochan & Weinstein (1994) outline two main 
strategies used by US employers: 'the low road' and the 'high 
road': The 'low road' entails competitiveness gained by labour 
cost reductions (using lower waged and -skilled labour, lowering 
the existing wage levels, labour intensification, anti-union 
policies, relocation to 'green fields' etc. The 'high road' 
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entails achieving competitiveness in high-value-added product 
markets by way of upgrading the skills of the workforce (human 
resource development), rationalizing and reorganizing production 
and work systems, upgrading quality and innovating products of 
high value and differentiation. 
 
Taking an institutionalist approach to economic development at 
the macro level in industrialized and industrializing countries, 
Boyer (1994) emphasizes short-term and long-term dynamic 
efficiency delineating four national trajectories for adjustment 
to flexibility (1994 p.59):  
 
  * decentralized defensive strategies (USA, Canada, 
UK), where flexibility is gained by lay offs and employment 
adjustment, wage dispersion, plant closure and regional 
mobility. 
  * decentralized offensive strategies (Japan), where 
adjustment is achieved by internal job mobility, retraining and 
multi-skilled (polyvalency), bonus wage, product innovation 
  * Social-Democrat (centralized) offensive strategies 
(Sweden, Austria, partly Germany), generating flexibility by 
training inside and outside the enterprise, subsidized job 
creation, average wage variability, dynamic innovation. 
  * Hybrid strategies (Italy, France, Belgium), with 
flexibility requirements met mainly by rationalization, 
retrenchment, weak emphasis on retraining, wage rigidity and 
subsidized unemployment benefits. 
 
The same features might be generated in developing countries 
adding that the political context in many countries has been 
authoritarian rather than parliamentarian democratic. 
Centralized offensive strategies have been implemented by state 
intervention in South Korea and Singapore. Hybrid strategies 
have been introduced in India (somewhere with unemployment 
programmes securing employment at minimum wages). Decentralized 
defensive strategies have been used in Malaysia while later on 
aiming at combined offensive strategies.  
 
We can now proceed with the question of development content 
specification. Focusing at capitalist market economies, we may 
safely outline the following features as important development 
criteria, admitting that their actual prioritization by the 
actors depends on the historical juncture and cultural 
understanding: 
 
 
Table 2: Culture based and class related criteria for development 
LABOUR CAPITAL 
* Employment 
* Wages and total earnings 
* Working conditions 
* Growth 
* Profitability 
* Productivity 
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* Equality 
* Skill development and education 
* Empowerment 
* Differentiation 
* High-value products 
* Competitiveness 
 
 
Applying these indicators of 'labour-capital development' we can 
now specify four important development options in a union 
perspective: 
 
  * negative labour development, following absolute 
stagnation or reduction in wages, working conditions and other 
services; 
  * stable labour development, securing the same 
subsistence level in real terms; 
  * labour effectiveness, based on the generation of 
short-term 'dynamic efficiency' through productivity and real 
wage increases; 
  * labour development, based on long-term 'high value 
efficiency', productivity and quality enhancements, higher 
earning levels, employment generation and security, and human 
resource development.   
 
Finally, the old, negative judgement by Galenson & Odaka can be 
questioned, contrasting it with the following questions: 
 
  1) Are enterprise unions weak and labour ineffective 
compared with nation-based unions in highly developed, 
industrial contexts? 
 
  1a) Have enterprise unions never evolved into 
nation-wide coverage in Western industrial societies due to 
their  labour ineffectiveness and dynamic inefficiency? 
 
  1b) Have Japanese enterprise unions achieved nation-
wide dominance because they generated 'dynamic efficiency' and 
hence became acceptable to both employees and managers?  
 
  2) In contexts of economic development and 
industrialization, are enterprise unions necessary weak unions, 
subordinated the power of management and forced into 
establishing or affiliating national unions during the process 
of development? 
 
  2a) Are enterprise unions necessarily 'backward' 
relative to national based unions in authoritarian, state 
regulated developing societies?  
 
  2b) Are enterprise unions per se facilitating 
increased productivity and overall company profitability 
(business effectiveness) and unable to further labour 
effectiveness or dynamic efficiency in contexts of 
industrialization and 'development statism'? 
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  3) Is it possible to delineate the dynamics of 
enterprise unionism generating divergent union effects in 
different contexts and junctures and to formulate a more 
contextualized theory of enterprise unionism in an era of 
globalization?  
 
As the present paper is based on secondary material, we have to 
confine our analysis to issues dealt with by other researchers. 
Thereby, we are unable to perform a systematic structured and 
consistent analysis of enterprise unions, operating in different 
contexts, historical junctures and cultural frameworks. But we 
shall attempt to apply the 'contextual comparative' method, 
outlined by Loche & Thelen (1995).  
 
Loche & Thelen aim at transcending the conventional comparative 
analytical method which cannot cope with situations where 
similar institutions generate different responses to the same 
external pressures and diverse institutions similar responses. 
Addressing industrial relations issues Loche & Thelen proposed 
the concept of 'union identity', i.e. the cognition and 
valuation by the union of the very foundation of the union and 
its prospects in a certain context and juncture. The 'union 
identity' determines union priorities in key issues and its 
policy and practice towards key actors in the industrial 
relation system.  
 
The actual selection of countries for case study is directed by 
the actual existence of enterprise unions and relevant studies 
hereof. The USA appears to be very illustrative as its legacy of 
enterprise unions seems to form the mainstream notion of 
enterprise unionism in the West (2). Japan is evident as the 
exception to the rule that industrial countries have nation-wide 
trade unions (industry-, craft or job-based). Being more 
widespread in developing countries, but less researched, the 
selected studies on enterprise unions concern South Korea, 
having large majority of enterprise unions, and Mexico, India 
and Malaysia, where enterprise unions form the minority at the 
national level while dominating within certain industries and 
sectors. 
 
In sum, the country case studies covers the following contexts: 
 
 
Tabel 3: The stratified sample of country-cases  
 Minority position of enterprise 
unions  
Majority position of enterprise 
unions 
Advanced industrial country USA Japan 
Industrializing country Mexico, India, Malaysia South Korea 
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The paper delimits itself in two ways. First, it concentrates on 
particular labour organizations within specific and changing 
societies. It does not intend to enter the discussion of the 
transferability of Japanese industrial relations to disparate 
contexts. This problem area deserves a separate paper to address 
the huge publication on 'Japanization' (for recent publications 
on the issue, see Elgar & Smith 1994; special issue of Journal 
of Management Studies 1995). 
 
Second, it withstands the temptation to analyze the political 
aspects and impact of enterprise unionism, not because it is 
insignificant or irrelevant, but because it would take a new 
paper, too. 
 
 
 1.3. Structure of paper 
Addressing the first main question section 2 analyse the failure 
of enterprise unionism in Western industrial settings by looking 
into the contemporary performance of US enterprise unions. The 
surprising finding, that US enterprise unions probably perform 
very well, raises the puzzling question why enterprise unionism 
have failed to expand during the long rise and decline of US 
national unions. The explanation is sought, partly by reviewing 
the legacy of company unionism rooted in US welfare capitalism 
at the dawn of the twentieth (American) century, and partly by 
analysing the overall decline of US unionism since the middle of 
the 1950s. Within the modified New Deal regime contemporary 
enterprise unionism faces a three front struggle which cannot be 
won although the global economic trend and search for 
productivity and flexibility enhancements seem to favour 
enterprise based unionism instead of national unions. 
 
The uniqueness of the Japanese industrial relation system is 
dealt with (section 3) by focusing at the changing understanding 
of Japanese unionism and development, the evolution of the 
national system of enterprise unions, and its strength and 
weaknesses compared to other industrial nations. While the 
dominant understanding of the Japanese industrial relation 
system today is that it has been conducive for the development 
of a productive system which is now reaching the point of 
becoming a model for imitation or generalization (yet expelling 
the component of enterprise unions; see e.g. Womack et.al. 
1990), the tricky question is why Japanese unions have declined 
anyway? Is it because they cannot deliver the benefits expected 
by the members, indicating that Galenson & Odaka's assessment is 
valid though? 
 
Addressing the second main question of enterprise unions in 
contexts of industrialization and 'development statism', section 
4 analyses studies of enterprise unions in Mexico, India, 
Malaysia and South Korea. The evidence points to the fact that, 
in contexts of strong political intervention in the economy and 
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the industrial relations system, enterprise unions may turn into 
independent, democratic and militant unions performing very well 
in terms of labour effects. When forced upon the industrial 
labour force and restricted to recruiting members among blue 
collar workers (South Korea) many enterprise unions evolve into 
radical political oriented unions in junctures of social 
upheavals. When they evolve by breaking away from the dominant 
state corporatist unions (Mexico) or from politicized unions 
(India) they may form the backbone of a new independent and 
militant unionism giving priority to 'rice and curry' issues 
instead of political concessions. And they succeed - at least 
for a while. Enterprise unions act contrary to the expected 
behaviour though. Is this explainable by taking the socio-
cultural base and union government into considerations? 
 
Using material from an ILO study of the Malaysian labour market 
(Standing 1991, 1992) section 4 explores the performance of 
enterprise unions vis-a-vis national unions in contexts of 
development. The Malaysian government has supported enterprise 
('in-house') unionism since 1982 as part of a mere general 
policy of industrialization and development. Surveying the 
Malaysian economy in 1988 when it was regaining its momentum 
after two years of economic recession (1985-86), the study 
concludes to the advantage of the industrial unions both in 
terms of company and labour benefits ('dynamic efficiency'). 
Critically reviewing Standing's material another controversial 
conclusion is reached: Employees should choose enterprise unions 
when they look for the best overall package of employee benefits 
(earnings, wage equality, employments security, training), while 
industrial unions should be preferred by managers because 
industrial unions facilitates the achievement of higher 
productivity performance without getting extraordinary labour 
costs (as they do in companies with enterprise unions). The 
Malaysian case raises a paradox which might be understood by way 
of looking at various features of labour market flexibility.  
 
Section 5 finalizes the paper by presenting the contextualized 
conclusions on enterprise unionism and labour/business 
development in divergent contexts of industrialization and union 
structures. The experiences indicate that enterprise unions can 
be backward, vanguard or normal unions in the perspectives of 
labour as well as capital. However, the precise dynamics 
generating these outcomes are still hidden in the complexities 
of the historical, economic, political, social and cultural 
contexts where they have been formed and practised. New areas 
like industrial reorganization and business strategies must be 
incorporated by the analysis in order to establish empirically 
based valuations of the strength and weaknesses of enterprise 
unions around the world. This work is ongoing with a multiple 
case-study of enterprise unions and structural change in 
Malaysia (Wad 1994). 
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 2. ENTERPRISE UNIONS IN THE US-CONTEXT 
Section 2 outlines, first, the labour effectiveness of 
enterprise unions in a multi-plant US company, and second, the 
legacy of US company unionism from three periods of US unionism: 
the rise and failure of US welfare capitalism before the 1930s; 
the breakthrough of national unionism during the New Deal era; 
the decline of national and enterprise unionism since the 1950s. 
Explaining the failure of US enterprise unions the twin 
character of US national and enterprise unions is emphasized 
together with the obstacles presented by the modified New Deal 
framework and the power and identity of US national unions.    
 
 2.1. The union complexity of a multi-plant US company 
During the decades of US economic stagnation (1970s-80s) and the 
business search of increased competitiveness,  'Employee 
Involvement Programs' (EIPs) were vigorously promoted especially 
among larger companies in the non-unionized sector. EIPs include 
quality circles, teamwork, career development, employment 
security and complaint systems. The EIP-model is basically based 
on a rejection of the collective bargaining model and forms an 
alternative ('participatory') model for firms pursuing a 
strategy for productivity and quality improvements in 
cooperation with the employees and without union interference.  
 
Recognizing that the lack of an independent voice within 
companies posed a serious problem to the sustainability of the 
EIPs, researcher looked for alternatives to combine EIPs with 
independent employee representation. While many sought 
alternatives across the oceans - the European 'works councils', 
or the Japanese enterprise unions, Jacoby & Verma (1992) went 
for domestic alternatives. They chose the ignored US enterprise 
unions, or 'independent local unions' (ILUs), as they prefer to 
call them, to emphasize their single employer and unaffiliated 
character. Their argument for a reconsideration of enterprise 
unionism is based on a company case study of TRW Inc. This 
company run 84 plants around 1980, including non-unionized 
shops, plants with enterprise unions, and workplaces with locals 
of affiliated national unions ('union locals'). 
 
The TRW Inc. was founded in 1901 in Cleveland, Ohio (Thompson 
Products) and merged with Ramo-Wooldridge in 1958 (TRW Inc.). 
Until the 1930s Thompson Products was a rather small company 
without modern personnel management, but this situation changed 
with a new leadership taking over in 1933. During the 1940s and 
1950s the management became a leading advocator of independent 
local unionism as part of a larger employee welfare and 
representation policy. Around 1960, the company changed 
personnel policy again and became a well-known practitioner of 
the new anti-union policy. While enterprise unions were 
established at nearly all plants before 1960 (only two were 
organized by national unions), no enterprise unions were set up 
at any of the 66 factories built or acquired during the 
following two decades. 60% of the new plants of the 1960s were 
 12
 
 
 
 
 
open shops, and this increased to 95% for the new plants of the 
1970s. 
 
The last dramatic shift in TRW's policy toward unionism is 
explained by Jacoby & Verma in the following way: 
 
  "First, there was always the danger that an ILU 
would affiliate with a national union or become as adversarial 
as an affiliated local (...). Second, collective bargaining and 
contract administration are time-consuming procedures that limit 
management's ability to prompt and unquestioned decisions. 
Employers were willing to shoulder these burdens when national 
unions  imposed a threat, but by the early 1960s that threat had 
begun to fade, and, at the same time, a new nonunion workplace 
model became available, one that combined some of the voice 
features of company unionism with EIPs and other programs for 
group flexibility and participation (...). Finally, there was 
the possibility that TRW could cut its labour costs by using 
nonunion labour if, as some alleged, it paid wage premiums to 
workers represented by ILUs..." (Jacoby & Verma 1992 p.145-46). 
 
This explanation says that employers prefer un-unionized to 
unionized plants, and if necessary, enterprise unions to 
national unions despite the fact that enterprise unions secure 
higher wages. Jacoby & Verma's conclusion, thereby, presents a 
paradox indicating on the one hand that enterprise unions are 
more labour effective than national unions, and on the other 
hand that employers still prefer the strong ones to the weak 
ones!  
 
The wage effect of ILUs were confirmed by Jacoby & Verma's 
study. In sum, it found that: 
 
  * the ILU-plants had the highest level of average 
wages and total benefits in both 1979 and 1983 compared to the 
non-unionized subsidiaries and to the plants with union locals. 
The differences narrowed partly during the period 1979-83 in 
terms of wages while they widened in terms of benefits.  
 
  * the ILU compensation premium did not stem from 
preexisting geographic or skill differentials. 
 
  * the differences in work practices were larger 
between old and new plants than between ILU plants and 
affiliated union plants. This indicates, according to Jacoby & 
Verma, that higher ILU payments were not related to higher 
productivity.  
 
  * employee involvement programmes (EIPs) were 
established in open shops and ILU-plants to the same extend; in 
plants with union locals several EIP-practices (Quality of Work 
Life committees, sensing sessions and periodic employee-
management meetings) were not introduced. 
 13
 
 
 
 
 
 
From these results Jacoby & Verma argue that although ILUs allow 
employers to reduce expenses to conflict resolution and contract 
administration, ILUs secure higher overall payroll cost. 
Moreover, the new non-union model was still cheaper than the 
ILU-model while it provided the same favourable climate to EIPs-
initiatives compared with the ILU-plants. Finally, plant age 
rather than union status was the main impediment to TRW's 
transition to more flexible production methods. It was easier 
for the firm to adopt the EIPs in a "greenfield" setting than in 
an existing plant" (Jacoby & Verma 1992 p.153). 
 
From the management's point of view it seems very rational to 
prefer non-union plants with EIPs instead of enterprise 
unionized plants. Only one important question is not considered 
in depth: the dynamic efficiency of enterprise unions. Jacoby & 
Verma were unable to provide reliable data on the relation 
between the productivity of TRW's plants and their union 
structure.  
 
What is less understandable is, first of all, that US enterprise 
unions secured higher wages than national unions with their 
supposed greater strength, and second, that American workers did 
not flock around enterprise unions, considering that US workers 
and unions are considered to be economistic in their outlook?  
 
The explanation of the ILU-wage premium advocated by national 
unionists holds that corporations use the 'golden handcuffs' 
technique ('bribe') to prevent ILUs affiliating to national 
unions. But this argument presumes two things: First, that the 
plants with ILUs and the plants with national union locals have 
the same productivity. Second, that the ILUs are per se weaker 
than national unions: the better compensation cannot be caused 
by the strength of the ILU, therefore it must be a 'bribe' 
conceded by the employer due to the threat (strength) of the 
national unions.  
 
The conclusions of Jacoby & Verma are a bit flimsy, here. First, 
they concede that the ILU plants and national union plants 
differed in terms of work organisation and practices, yet they 
disregard the union effect in favour of the plant age effect. 
Second, they concede that the extra compensation paid by 
managements both between nonunion plants and enterprise 
unionized plants, and between ILU and national union plants, can 
partly be understood as a 'bribe', due to the fact that the 
likelihood is far greater for an ILU to affiliate to a national 
union than for a non-unionized workforce to do so. But they do 
also argue that the differentials between ILUs and union locals 
has at least partly to be explained by bargaining power 
differentials:  
 
  * ILUs have not abandoned the strike, and they did 
strike on several occasions.  
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  * ILUs can threaten to strike.  
  * ILUs can influence management's perception of the 
ILU's likelihood to affiliate.  
  * ILUs are more decentralized and democratic unions, 
which lay the ground for more effective bargaining. 
 
The contradictory explanation of the ILU compensation premium 
relative to the affiliated union plant indicates that the basic 
assumption of the 'weak ILU' relative to the 'strong national 
union' has to be questioned. And furthermore the premise that 
employers per se prefer ILUs to affiliated unions. Why should 
they if enterprise unions are strong, militant and gains better 
compensations for their members? They will probably only do that 
if they can secure much higher productivity levels.  
 
Jacoby & Verma's study does not present much evidence on the 
reluctance of American workers to join enterprise unions 
relative to national unions or to stay away from unions. We have 
to dig into the history of American enterprise unionism to find 
an answer to the changing perceptions of enterprise unions and 
the overall rise and fall of this type of unionism. 
 
 
 2.2. Company unions and welfare capitalism 
The US notion of enterprise unions as 'company unions', i.e. 
management initiated enterprise level unionization, goes back to 
the nineteenth century and rose to prominence with the discourse 
of American 'welfare capitalism'.  
 
Welfare capitalism evolved into a variety of management provided 
services: company housing, education, recreation, medical care, 
pension schemes, profit sharing, company controlled enterprise 
unions and more widely 'employee representation plans' or 'work 
councils' (Brandes 1976 p.120; Freeman & Medoff 1984 p. 108). 
Big business with John D. Rockefeller headed the campaign for 
company unions in the golden age of American capitalism in the 
1920s, arguing in favour of company unionism with their utopian 
philosophy of the company as a world of harmony, emphasizing the 
common interest of management and workers at the company level. 
  
In the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century welfare 
capitalism presented a humanistic and enlightened alternative to 
the prevalent 'big stick' policy of employers. 'Big stick' 
employers obtained weapons and hired guards to quell strikes and 
purge unionists. If necessary, troops were called in. Strike 
violence was suppressed by the army around 500 times between 
1875 and 1910, culminating nearly into civil warfare in the coal 
mines of West Virginia in 1919 (Brandes 1976 p.2-3). 
 
The positive aspect of US welfare capitalism is, therefore, that 
the employers realized that they were part of the problem and 
hence part of the solution. Industrial strife was generated as 
much by businessmen's antagonism to unions as unions actions 
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against companies (Brandes 1976 p. 6). 
 
The main motivation for company unionism and welfare capitalism 
was the increasing violence in industrial relations and the 
drives for unionization (Burawoy 1979 p 233; Brandes 1976 p. 32, 
145; Bernstein 1960 p.157). For example, John D. Rockefeller 
initiated one of the first welfare schemes after the Ludlow 
Massacre of 1914 which took place in relation to the attempt by 
the United Mine Workers to organise the Colorado Fuel & Iron 
Company of which Rockefeller was a board member. After World War 
I union agitation and strikes increased and so did the 
establishment of company unions: 490 firms got company unions 
during the turbulent period of 1919-1924 (Bernstein op.cit.).  
 
 
The drive in company unionism stagnated in the second half of 
the 1920s. Only 73 enterprises got company unions during the 
calm years of 1924-1928.  
 
This trend seems to fit the explanatory factor of the rise of 
company unionism, too. When the militancy and threat of national 
unionization fade away, so do employers' interest in company 
unionism. Besides, several unions had sought assistance from 
criminal groups against the tough measures taken by anti-union 
employers, and some fell victim to gansters (Jensen & Strømgren 
1988).   
 
Some researchers have argued that US 'welfare capitalism' might 
have developed if the economic crisis of the 1930s had not 
occurred. Brandes (1976) provides a critique of this hypothesis 
arguing that welfare capitalism was already stagnating in the 
second half of the 1920s due to the overall modernization 
process of USA and the experiences gained. He list several 
factors causing the impasse: the spread of cheaper automobiles 
making workers more independent of company towns and housing 
schemes; general prosperity during the 1920s; development in 
production technology; increasing size of enterprises with loss 
of direct contact between management and employees; 
counterproductive experiences by employers realising that 
company unions were taken over by craft or industrial unions, 
that employee representation generated increasing demands 
instead of lowering them, and that employees lost interest in 
the schemes. 
 
Additional 'agency' factors conditioned the decline. In the 
early twentieth century a third approach (relative to 'big 
stick' and 'welfare capitalism' strategies) was invented by 
Frederick W. Taylor. 'Taylorism' (or 'scientific management') 
denoted a tremendous differentiation in work processes, 
specialization of jobs, employment of unskilled or semiskilled 
workers in technologically sophisticated productions, and 
centralization of management control over the production 
process. Despite the fact that Taylorists and 'welfare 
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capitalists' had a common and positive perception of factory 
production, adherents of Taylorism were very critical of 
'welfare capitalism' in the early days. Taylor simply called 
'welfare capitalism' 'a joke'. Later on both sides moderated 
their attitudes, and co-existed (Brandes 1976 p. 26). 
 
Galenson & Odaka explain the failure of company unionism and 
welfare capitalism with the lack of legitimacy among workers on 
the one hand and the alternative New Deal regime on the other 
hand: 
 
  "Welfare capitalism in the United States did not 
originate in any particular social tradition; it was a conscious 
and, in some cases at least, sincere attempt by business leaders 
to find a solution to a vexing problem. Its span of existence 
was brief, and it never had more than a toehold among workers. 
The social revolution of the l930s eliminated it as a meaningful 
force in American life" (Galenson & Odaka 1976 p. 641). 
 
This conclusion neglects the decisive roles played by big 
business on the one hand and workers' militancy and drives for 
national unionization at the other hand. The story of US 
enterprise unionism must proceed to put US enterprise unions in 
the right perspective. 
 
 
2.3. The New Deal regime and independent local unions 
An alternative to 'big stick', 'welfare capitalism' (and 
'Taylorism'), 'tripartism' provided the formula for handling "a 
continuing tug of war between big labour and big business with 
government seeking to prevent either side from gaining 
predominance" (Brandes 1976 p.6).  
 
This approach succeeded during the economic crisis of the 1930s 
with the instalment of the Roosevelt administration and the 
implementation of the New Deal policy. Tripartism, supplemented 
with welfare state policies ousted and outlawed welfare 
capitalism on the one hand and 'big stick' policy on the other 
hand. Moreover, it provided a framework for the development of 
Taylorism, transforming scientific management into line 
production, and a new societal production system, known as 
Fordism, composed of mass production, mass consumption, 
collective bargaining between big business and big labour, and 
state provided social services.  
 
The New Deal regime created ample political space for national 
unions to overtake 'company unions' or for company union members 
to turn them into independent local unions. According to Jacoby 
& Verma (1992), many company unions were in fact reconstituted 
as ILUs, because the Wagner Act forbade employers to control, 
influence or financially support labour organizations. The 
National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) monitored and intervened 
in these cases of 'unfair labour practices', requiring their 
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reestablishment and prohibiting their participation in union 
election ballots, while using less severe means against 
'sweetheart' situations between employers and locals of 
affiliated unions (Jacoby & Verma 1992 p.139).  
 
The political support of the Roosevelt administration to 
industrial unions accomplished the formation and expansion of 
industrial unions of unskilled workers in mass production 
industries. In the automobile industry, for example, several 
enterprise unions amalgamated into the United Automobile Workers 
of America (UAW) within three years in the 1930s (Galenson & 
Odaka 1976 o. 631). And industrial unions federated into the 
CIO, which, in terms of membership, surpassed AFL, the 
federation of craft unions. 
 
Shostak (1962 p.3-4) holds that company unions counted 2 million 
members in 1935 and only 400000 (belonging to 1400 unions) in 
1961. The fall took place in a short period of time after the 
Wagner Act was upheld by the courts in 1937, and the NLRB and 
the national unions subsequently scrutinized and pushed most 
company unions into locals or turned they down (Shostak 1962 
pp.3-4).  
 
During the 1940s the discrimination against enterprise unions 
gave rise to criticism from Congress and the courts. The NLRB 
thereafter treated enterprise unions more leniently. After the 
1947 Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRB accepted that ILUs competed with 
affiliated unions. In this more permissive context, enterprise 
unions increased in numbers until 1960.  
 
Shostak (1962) outlines a bleak future for independent local 
unionism, arguing that the very character of the single-firm 
independent union is a source of its jeopardy: 
 
  "At a time when dealings between labour and 
management are everywhere characterized by consolidation - with 
contracts negotiated between a single giant union and a 
combination of its many employers, with mergers of unions 
themselves into still larger organizations - the independence of 
the single-firm union makes it something of an anachronism. Its 
emphasis on leadership from its ranks handicaps it in dealing 
with the increasing professionalism of management in industry. 
Its focus on the plant and the employer to the exclusion of 
interest in public affairs and the labour movement in general 
means that it is overlooked by politicians and labour 
specialists. Its conservatism robs it of the possibility of 
rallying support for exciting issues." (Shostak 1962 p. 128-
129). 
 
Anyway, Shostak is also fascinated by the enterprise union as it 
represents "an ideal of Jeffersonian democracy": it allows the 
rank-and-file to voice their views; it permits flexibility and 
ingenuity towards arising problems without external 
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interference; it rejects the traditional hostility between 
employer and employees in order to achieve common goals (1962 
p.129). But the situation (around 1960) is poor: "weak 
independents are pitiful and strong independents are 
hardpressed" (by national unions for incorporation) (1962 
p.130). 
 
In fact, independent enterprise unionism rose during the 1950s, 
peaked around 1960, lost its organizational momentum during the 
1960s and declined during the 1970s and 1980s. In 1983, ILUs 
mastered 3 % of total US union membership, i.e. approximate 
500000 members in 1500 ILUs (Jacoby & Verma 1992 p. 139-140). In 
absolute numbers the level is slightly above the 1960-level. In 
relative terms enterprise unions hold about the same share of 
total union membership: 2.4% in 1961 and 2.5% in 1982/83, and a 
declining union density relative to total labour force (from 
0.55% in 1961 to 0.45% in 1982/83) and non-agricultural labour 
force (from 0.73% in 1961 to 0.52% in 1982/83 (calculations 
based on Bernstein's figures 1987 p. 10-11 table 1; Bernstein 
presents figures for the years 1960, 1962, 1982 for total union 
membership, labour force and nonagricultural labour force).  
 
The figures indicate that enterprise unions stabilized their 
position among American unions, but both enterprise unions and 
national unions declined relative to the expansion of the labour 
force. The fate of enterprise unionism seems to be linked to the 
overall weakening position of US labour unions.  
 
How and why did this decline take place? Did it signal the 
development of a new formula substituting the New Deal 
industrial relation system with a system, based on non-unionized 
enterprise with employee participation? 
 
 
 2.4. Declining US unionism  
In general, US trade unionism reached an impasse in the middle 
of the 1950s. In 1954, it peaked with 35% union density and 
then, union membership declined below 16% of the total labour 
force and 12% of the private sector labour force in 1994 (Kochan 
& Weinstein 1994 p.484). 
 
Analysing this significant decline of US-unionism from the 
middle of the 1950s to the 1980s, Goldfield (1987) argues that 
the decline was neither a negative response from employees to 
unionism, nor a manifestation of a docile working class in USA. 
 Instead, Goldfield emphasizes three broad detrimental aspects 
of the changing class relations to organized labour in the USA 
(Goldfield 1987 p. 231): 
 
  * offensive of U.S. business against new union 
organising; 
  * increasingly pro-employer public policies; 
  * lack of membership and general resource 
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mobilization by    labour unions to counterbalance the decrease 
of union       power. 
 
The enduring offensive of US business have taken two roads, 
following Kochan & Weinstein (1994): 1) the low wage and anti-
union strategy, and 2) the introduction of workplace innovations 
in order to upgrade productivity, product quality and 
competitiveness in high value added-product markets (Kochan & 
Weinstein 1994 p. 486-87). These roads are also called the 'low 
road' and the 'high road'.  
 
The question is why the unions should become a prime target of 
US employers irrespective of the road chosen? 
 
Blanchflower & Freeman (1992) emphasize the unique union wage 
effect in the US. They argue convincingly that, compared with 
other countries, US unions have a much larger impact on wages - 
delivering a union wage premium around 20-25% relative to non-
union settings.  
 
However, the US union wage differential might be offset by 
similar productivity differentials, producing appropriate 
profitability levels for US business.  
 
Blanchflower & Freeman conclude, based on the extensive evidence 
from the USA, that the productivity offset is modest or dubious 
(1992 p.70). More specifically the relationship between unionism 
and productivity/technology takes the following features (1992 
p.69): 
 
  * productivity growth is probably slightly lower in 
unionized settings than in un-unionized ones; 
  * new technologies are adopted as rapidly in 
unionized as in non-unionized enterprises; 
  * spending on research, development and investment 
are lower in unionized than in non-unionized enterprises. 
 
Research on unionism and profitability is limited. For the USA 
it is nevertheless rather conclusive: US unionism is correlated 
with markedly lower profitability (Blanchflower & Freeman 1992 
p.69). Blanchflower & Freeman argue that "In the United States, 
the profits effect results from the large effect of unionism on 
wages, which exceeds the positive effect of unions on 
productivity." (1992 p.69) 
 
Blanchflower & Freeman are sure that the union-wage-effect-cum-
no-union-productivity-offset causes the employers to anti-union 
tactics producing the overall decline in union density (and not 
the other way around). In consequence, the climate of industrial 
relations deteriorate, which again creates impediments to 
productivity improvements. For, as Blanchflower & Freeman argue 
"it is the state of labour relations rather than unionism and 
collective bargaining per se that determines productivity" (1992 
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p.68). Thereby, the whole culture of US industrial relations 
impedes the productivity options offered by the unions. 
 
The lack of political influence (Bernstein's second factor) 
stems from the fact that the US union movement never succeeded 
with the establishment of a working class party, nor did they 
manage to secure support from the Democratic party to its 
important policies. The cardinal issue - organizing the US-South 
- was neglected as the union leaders subordinated union demands 
in favour of the New Deal coalition between Northern and 
Southern regions of the USA.  
 
The dubious role played by the national unions in organizing new 
plants and areas is enforced by the lack of overall social 
upheavals. Goldfield points out that upsurge in unionization 
seems to take place in a context of general social mobilization. 
The bureaucratization and de-democratization of US unions after 
the heights of the 1930s, accompanied with the purge of radical 
activists and unionists, reduced the potential for rank-and-file 
mobilization. Democratic grass root influence only survived in a 
few cases, e.g. the 'Teamsters for a Democratic Union'.  
 
Applying this explanatory framework to the decline of enterprise 
unions, it becomes obvious that enterprise unions faced a 
struggle on three frontiers: 
 
  * Generating higher earnings than national unions, 
and being ineffective against (declining) national unionism, 
enterprise unions become targets of the employers' abti-union 
offensive, not temporary allies as in the days of welfare 
capitalism. 
  * Being an alternative type of unionism, national 
unions tried to take over or prevent enterprise unions from 
expanding, especially in a period of union setback.  
  * Lacking political muscles enterprise unions have 
no influence on state and federal labour policies and cannot 
open up new space for independent local union mobilization. 
 
Although the New Deal regime was modified, it was changed in 
detrimental ways to enterprise unions and unionism in general. 
Moreover, enterprise unions became victimized as the employers 
did not any longer see them as different from national unions. 
They became part and parcel of the same overall changes of the 
US society. Both types of unionism face the same challenge: How 
to stop and turn around the decline of US unions in terms of 
union power and leadership at local, regional and national 
levels?  
 
 
 2.5. The power and identity of US unions  
Kochan & Weinstein contend that, within a historical 
perspective, systemic changes in the US industrial relations 
system are to be a very difficult process, adding that systemic 
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changes incorporating trade unions are necessary to sustain 
innovations, and concluding that the attitude of the management 
is decisive: 
 
  "The importance of systemic change in producing 
economically viable and durable alternatives to the New Deal 
industrial relations system helps to explain the increasing 
evidence that these systems are more likely to endure in a 
unionized environment (Levine and Tyson 1990; Kochan and 
Osterman 1994). It is in these settings that parties have 
broadened the scope of issues addressed by production teams and 
have integrated production issues with human resource policies 
of the firm. Work practice changes such as the introduction of 
team systems and the involvement of workers in shop-floor 
problem-solving groups lead to improvements in productivity and 
product quality only if they are accompanied by parallel changes 
within management." (Kochan & Weinstein 1994 p. 497). 
 
The key question affecting US business seems to be the unique 
high union wage effect without compensating productivity gains. 
Therefore, the cardinal problem is why and how US unions achieve 
this extraordinary wage effect even in junctures of declining 
union density?   
 
Locke & Thelen (1995) locate the power and identity of American 
unionism at the enterprise level of work organization where the 
unions master extensive job control systems.  
 
The job control muscles of US unionism were developed during the 
New Deal regime (and emanated partly from the transformation of 
local unions into union locals). However, during the mass 
production Fordist era the system functioned well for the 
management (providing key managerial prerogatives) as well as 
for the union (generating employment and rising earnings): 
 
  "Job control practices gave unions a central role 
within the company, permitting them to "service" their 
membership and monitor labour relations in an otherwise "low 
trust" shop floor environment. It was also congruent with other 
key features of American industrial relations system (detailed 
wage rules, collective bargaining, and the supremacy of national 
unions)" (Locke & Thelen 1995 p. 357). 
 
During the present era of flexible specialization and 
globalization, the system is under pressure. Management is 
seeking increased productivity, product quality and flexibility. 
Providing that they have already wide discretionary powers 
regarding external labour flexibility (hiring, retrenchment), 
they seek increased internal flexibility (especially over work 
reorganization and job mobility). This clashes with the unions' 
identity and their strongholds in job control at the shop flor 
level. It generates serious industrial conflicts, which again 
motivate employers to adopt anti-union policies like Employees 
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Involvement Programmes, relocation of plants, anti-union tactics 
towards union recognition procedures etc.. 
 
The transition from one industrial relation system to another 
embraces among other things that the unions redefine their roles 
and outlook and shift to new powerful positions. Locke & Thelen 
envisage the end of American business unionism and the rise of a 
stronger political or societal involvement with European 
unionism as the model(s). Other researchers look for workplace 
participation schemes. Few foresee or propose a revival of 
enterprise unionism (Jacoby & Verma being an exception). 
 
Considering its historical record we may conclude that it is not 
a paradox that enterprise unionism is excluded from the agenda 
of the main actors of the US industrial relations system. 
Considering its contemporary labour effectiveness, it is a 
paradox that employees do not consider enterprise unionism as an 
appropriate alternative, especially not in an era of 
globalization, decentralization and the drive for enterprise 
flexibility. The American employee is increasingly lost (for the 
labour movement) between business' strategy for union-free 
workplaces and national unions' drive for union locals against 
local unionism. 
 
However, the US story cannot tell us about enterprise unionism 
in divergent contexts, for example a nation-wide system of 
enterprise unions (like the Japanese industrial relations 
system) or settings with a new movement of militant, independent 
and democratic enterprise unions opposing dominant corporative 
national unions (in Mexico and India during the 1970s and in 
Korea during the end of the 1980s). We proceed with these 
issues.   
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 3. ENTERPRISE UNIONISM IN JAPAN 
In this section we analyze the nation-wide system of enterprise 
unions in Japan. Various approaches to the Japanese industrial 
relation system are examined, followed by an assessment of the 
effects of Japanese enterprise unionism. A short description of 
the history of the Japanese union movement is outlined in order 
to better understand the contemporary union structure, strategy 
and impact. Finally, the overall decline of Japanese unions is 
explained by the relationship between union identity and power 
on the one hand and the corporative (company) consciousness of 
both unions and employers aiming towards the competitive 
development and expansion of the company combined with secure 
(core) employment and steady rise in real earnings. 
  
 3.1. Theoretical conceptions to Japanese unionism 
The perception and understanding of Japanese enterprise unionism 
have changed several times during the postwar era, depending on 
the perspectives and criteria applied. Hence, several 
theoretical frameworks are available. 
 
Kampmann (1986) proposed a triple classification of research 
approaches to the Japanese labour market and labour movement: 1) 
the classic cultural approach (Abegglen 1958), 2) the 
functionalist approach (Taira 1970, Taishiro Shirai & Haruo 
Shimada 1977, Cole 1971, Dore 1974) and 3) Marxist approaches 
(Shigeyoshi Tokunaga 1983, Muto Ichiyo 1981-84, Steven 1983, 
Halliday 1975).  
 
The evidence from the history and evolution of the Japanese 
labour movement disqualifies the cultural explanation as the 
sole explanatory framework. The particular nation-wide system of 
enterprise unions in Japan did not evolve directly out of 
Japanese culture. It was generated through conflict and 
cooperation within the larger political-economic and socio-
cultural context (see section 3.3.). 
 
The functional framework delivers contradicting assessments and 
explanations of the system of enterprise unions. Galenson & 
Odaka (1976) rejected enterprise unionism as a transitionary and 
weak form of labour organization (see section 1). Taira (1977) 
argues that enterprise unions are the adequate type of unionism 
in advanced industry due to the rise of internal labour markets. 
Shirai (1983 pp.140-141), adopting the theory of internal market 
and enterprise unionism, presents a mixed evaluation (see table 
1 below). 
 
Explaining the rise of enterprise unions with the rise of 
internal labour markets in larger corporations, Shirai (1983 
pp.124-128) admits that additional factors operate. Otherwise, 
US corporations would generate enterprise unions, too. The key 
contributing factors are, first, the late development of 
Japanese labour unions, succeeding the establishment of big 
corporations with internal labour markets; and second, the 
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cultural inclination of Japanese employees to develop 
'enterprise consciousness". In sum, Shirai concludes that 
"within the socioeconomic and cultural context of Japanese 
industrial  
 
Table 4: Virtues and faults of Japanese enterprise unions  
VIRTUES FAULTS 
* rapidly increased unionization 1946-49 
 
* more favourable and enlarged scope and subject 
matter of collective bargaining 
 
* organizing white collar employees 
 
* sound and stable union finances 
 
* good communication between union leaders and rank 
and file 
 
* access to management in day-to-day problem-
solving 
 
* a single united union within the enterprise as 
norm 
 
* positive attitude to flexible adjustment to 
industrial reorganization 
 
* contributed to the establishment of effective in-
plant/enterprise problem-solving institutions  
* dispersion of union resources at the 
decentralized level 
 
* impede the unity of the labour movement  
 
* unwilling to unionize unorganized or 
unemployed workers 
 
* are not taking responsibility for retired 
workers 
 
* suffer from administrative and financial 
inefficiencies 
 
* are susceptible to employer interference 
 
* relative weak in collective bargaining towards 
employers (private as well as public) 
 
 
 Source: Shirai 1983 
 
 
society, the enterprise union seems to employed workers to be 
the  most acceptable and effective form of union organization". 
Moreover,  he does not see any transforming forces of this 
pattern in the foreseeable future, partly because of normal 
union conservatism, partly because of the trend in industrial 
development: 
 
  "the growing importance of industrial relations 
problems at the plant and enterprise levels will continue to 
demand an effective union organization and activity at those 
levels." (1983 p.142).  
 
Taking a broader societal perspective and adopting a Marxist 
oriented class struggle approach, Kawanishi (1992) describes the 
changing theoretical landscapes of Japanese enterprise unionism 
by a four stage model: 
 
The first stage of comprehension (1945-55) is dominated by 
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Westernization (modernization and democratization), providing a 
negative assessment of Japanese industrial relations (life-long 
employment, seniority wages, enterprise unions) as relics of 
Japanese feudalism. 
 
The second stage (1955-65) provides a more complex assessment, 
stressing the positive and negative aspects of the unique 
institutions of the Japanese labour market and Japanese 
management. 
 
The third stage (1965-75) presents a break through for 
widespread acknowledgement of the positive impact of Japan's 
industrial relations on economic growth. 
 
The fourth stage (1975-85) turns the successful model of 
Japanese industrial relations into an international model to be 
applied piecemeal or in total by industrial and developing 
countries. 
 
The theoretical vacuum after 1985 is caused by the fact that the 
Japanese version of Kawanishi's book was written between 1977-84 
and the English version was not updated!  
 
Kawanashi's study adds to the complexity of the 'enterprise 
union' phenomenon: He focuses at the 'multiple enterprise 
union', understood as enterprises with two or three types of 
enterprise unions at the same enterprise! Kawanishi 
differentiates between 1) enterprise unions incorporating all 
employees of the firm, 2) enterprise unions sharing employees 
with another enterprise union, and 3) the new type of union, 
i.e. minority leftist enterprise unions. The rationale for 
Kawanishi's study is that these union schisms have been overlook 
in earlier research (Kawanishi 1992 chap. 3).  
 
Kawanishi evaluates the Japanese unions by the 'true principles 
of the labour movement' (yet without relating it to Western 
Marxist industrial relation theory e.g. Hyman 1976). Kawanishi 
gives the dominant Japanese enterprise unions a bad record in 
terms of their effect on the fulfilment of the class interests 
of their members, i.e. wages, employment, hours of work and 
personnel practices (1992 p. 40-61). This conclusion is based on 
three qualitative case studies with negative assessments while 
rejecting a fourth positive study based on a questionnaire 
survey.  
 
While the Marxist approach counterbalanced the view of 
submissive, company oriented and singular enterprise unions 
(Shirai 1983), the Marxists have not dominated the understanding 
of Japanese industrial relations since 1985. The various 
approaches have more or less existed side by side during the 
post-War period. Yet, the functionalist and the Marxist 
approaches do share the same overall development perspective 
(industrialization and material consumption), and partly also 
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the criticism of Japanese enterprise unions (with divergent 
opinions among the functionalists).   
 
In general, Japanese unionism is increasingly recognized as 
contributing to the rapid economic development and 
industrialization in Japan. Japanese enterprise unionism is  
perceived as business effective. Their labour effectiveness and 
overall dynamic and development efficiency are disputed. Do 
these assessments hold for a closer examination? 
 
 
3.2. The effectiveness of Japanese unions    
Japanese labour organizations can be judged on their labour 
effectiveness, business effectiveness and the overall dynamic 
efficiency. Here, labour effectiveness is assessed in terms of 
the improvement of employment security, wages, social benefits, 
overall earnings, and working conditions (e.g. reduced working 
hours). Business effectiveness is estimated in terms of 
productivity and profitability.  
 
Labour effectiveness 
One of the distinguished features of the Japanese labour market 
has been it's low level of unemployment. The unemployment rate 
is around 2% for adult male employees (25+ years) in 1989/90 and 
1% for adult female employees, compared with the respective 
figures in USA 4% and 4%, and in Germany 10% and 14% (in Italy, 
it is surprisingly low, too, 3% and 3%, but here the youth 
unemployment figures are very high, 26% and 38% compared to 
Japan's 5% and 4%)(ILO World Labour Report 1992 table V pp. 98-
99). 
 
Acknowledging the wage improvements of Japanese workers since 
the Pacific War Kawanishi questions the impact of enterprise 
unions on wage increases, arguing that the wage improvements 
were caused by the overall economic growth and, during the 
1970s, the labour shortages (1992 p.42).  
 
Comparing the changing patterns of unionization in OECD 
countries Blanchflower & Freeman hold that the Japanese union 
wage differential is more similar to the differentials found in 
Europe and Australian than to the US differential, and they 
conclude: "U.S. unionism produces greater union-nonunion wage 
differentials than unionism in other advanced countries" (1992 
p. 65). 
 
Surprisingly, Blanchflower & Freeman do not explain the US 
anomaly (but use it to explain the anti-union strategy of US 
business). Referring to Japanese scholars (Nakumura et al. 1988; 
Osawa 1989) they indicate an explanation of the Japanese 
normalcy: 
 
  "In Japan union wage effects are small except for 
women, presumably because the Shunto Offensive sets wage 
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patterns for the entire country, and union effects on bonuses 
and severance pay do not come close to producing a differential 
of U.S. magnitude" (1992 p.65)   
 
This argument contradicts the view that Japanese unions are weak 
and therefore do not influence wages. On the contrary, they set 
the pace of wage improvements, but the non-unionized companies 
and employees follow due to the flexibility of the Japanese 
labour market. Moreover, high union density is also related to 
low wage differentials in Europe. Non-union employees outside 
USA seem to enjoin a strong free-rider premium due to labour 
market flexibility and medium to strong unions. 
 
Although there seems to be low union wage differentials Japanese 
enterprise unions can still affect an overall rise in wages due 
to their nation-wide coverage and the diffusion of wages rises 
from the unionized to the non-unionized sector. What we can 
document is that improvements in earnings (compensation per 
hour) in the manufacturing sector are comparable with US and 
Canadian increases from 1980-1993 (index respectively 157, 152, 
159 with 1980=100) but below European rates (Denmark 171; 
Germany 178; France 180; UK 236; Italy 266). Taking the period 
1960-80, the Japanese increases average the European level 
(1980=100, Japan started at index 6; Denmark 8; Germany 14; 
France 8; UK 7; Italy 4) (Monthly Labour Review June 1995, table 
48 p.116; no figures for USA). 
 
Similar levels of compensation may finally reflect different 
composition of the earnings, e.g. lower wage levels and higher 
benefits (the social wage). While the Japanese industrial 
relation system has the reputation of 'company welfarism' (high 
social wages) the evidence points to the fact that the social 
wage of Japanese production workers (non-wage cost of hourly 
compensation costs) in manufacturing was lower than in other 
industrialized countries: 13% in Japan in 1990, compared to 15% 
in UK, 20% in USA, 21% in Germany, 30% in France, and 32% in 
Italy (ILO World Labour Report 1992 table VI p.100-101). 
 
Business effectiveness and dynamic efficiency 
In terms of unit labour cost, Japanese manufacturing is very 
competitive compared to US manufacturing - if it is measured on 
a national currency basis: Using an index with 1982=100, Japan 
scored 100 in 1993 with USA at 116 (Japan started at index 25 in 
1960). Measuring in US dollars, Japan rose to 224 in 1993 with 
USA still at 116 (Monthly Labour Review June 1995 table 48 
p.116). The revaluation of the Japanese Yen relative to US 
dollars explains the contradictory trends.  
 
Research on Japanese unions' effect on productivity is scarce. 
Muramatsu's study of Japan (1984) found a positive union effect, 
but it is inconclusive (Blanchflower & Freeman  1992 p. 68) 
because it did not control for firm size which influences 
productivity levels rather much.  
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Finally, in terms of profitability Japanese enterprise unionism 
should contribute positively on the premises, that their wage 
effect is small to nil, and they have a positive leverage on 
productivity. The evidence on union productivity effect is still 
lacking although there are indications that unions facilitate 
increasing productivity, among other things, by accepting and 
participating in flexible labour systems at the enterprise level 
(Deutschmann 1987). 
 
Summing up, Japanese enterprise unions seem to posses dynamic 
efficiency with a bias to business effectiveness. 
 
How the Japanese union movement took up this position, known as 
'welfare corporatism', is a matter of historical development, 
union strength and union identity. 
 
 
 3.3. A socio-political history of Japanese unionism 
To delineate the broad trends of Japanese unionism the ideology 
of the key labour centres (main federations of enterprise 
unions) are used as indicators, although the power base of the 
Japanese union movement is the enterprise union. We acknowledge 
by the way that Japanese unions and their members are more 
political-ideological conscious than their US ditto, indicated 
by the loose federations with party affiliations to the centre 
and left of Japanese politics, at least until recently. 
 
The birth of the Japanese trade union movement goes far back to 
the Meiji-period (1868-1912) and it's 'industrial revolution 
from above'. Craft unionism, modelled after the American 
Federation of Labour (AFL), was initiated by craftsmen with US 
experiences, but it failed: the craft workers were a minority, 
the unions were heavily suppressed by the state (around 1900 and 
again in 1911), and the large textile industry employed young, 
unmarried women who were controlled the way Japanese parents 
treated their daughters (close to indentured labour or slave 
labour). 
 
Following World War I, mass mobilization did not bypass Japan 
and 'Rice Riots' were started by female long shore workers. 
After 1923, political repression reduced union activity, 
especially among craftsmen and socialist workers. During the 
inter-World War period the particular Japanese labour market 
institutions evolved, too: The life-long employment system based 
on the recruitment and enterprise training of young school 
leavers, the Nenko wage system based on seniority, education and 
employment status, and finally, the enterprise union, 
established primarily at the bigger plants within a scene of 
overall low union density (5-7%). In 1938, the military regime 
decided to eliminate all unions substituting them with 
organizations of the Patriotic Front (Sampo). 
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Sampo framed the corporate labour organization down to the plant 
level during World War II, and these enterprise based 
organizations provided the platform for explosive and radical 
unionization after the collapse of the military regime in 1945. 
With the tacit understanding of the US occupation forces which 
was staffed with New Deal reformers in the early post war years, 
a plant based union movement arose in the chaotic situation of 
food shortages, rising unemployment etc.. The unions demanded 
employment security, increased wages and social benefits, 
workers participation etc. The new enterprise unions were 
largely affiliated to the Communist-dominated confederation 
(Sanbetsu) and not to the pre-war dominant one (Sodomei).  
 
With the upcoming Cold War the US administration in Japan 
shifted from union sympathy to union hostility, banning a 1947 
general strike and supporting a counter-attack by Japanese 
employers and authorities. The Socialist Party joined the 
alliance, and the CP-controlled union movement was smashed 
during the 'red purge' in 1950. A replacement (Sohyo) was formed 
in the early 1950s under the control of the Socialist Party. 
 
In a short time, Sohyo became radicalized, cancelled the 
proposed affiliation to the ICFTU  and launched annual strike 
waves (the Spring Offensives, Shunto). The left wing policy of 
Sohyo and the Socialist Party generated new splits, with the 
establishment of the moderate Democratic Socialist Party and a 
new confederation (Zenro, 1954). 
 
Japanese big business initiated a campaign against radical 
independent enterprise unions. The Nissan union was defeated in 
1953 and a company controlled union was formed with the 
assistance of white collar workers and blue collar supervisors. 
The new Nissan union became an integral part of the personnel 
department. After Nissan the assault continued throughout the 
private sector by e.g. setting up 'second' unions during Spring 
offensives in key companies. In 1964, the new right-wing unions 
merged with Zenro unions into a new confederation (Domei, which 
had its strongholds in heavy industries like steel, shipyards, 
and car production. 
 
The militant Sohyo-oriented union movement was also gradually 
undermined through productivity and rationalization measures 
(the 'gorika' drive'; Ichiyo 1981-84): 1) reorganizing the 
labour process whereby the shop floor work groups disintegrated, 
2) introducing job-related wage incentives, thereby imposing 
competition between workers, 3) increased use of out-
contracting, and hence creating tensions between permanent, 
temporary and outside workers, and 4) integrating rank-and-file 
into the drive of the whole enterprise towards productivity and 
quality improvements by means of Quality Control Circles (QCCs), 
Zero Defect Circles (ZDCs), Cost Minimum Drives etc. 
 
During the economic recession in the 1970s and the early 1980s, 
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the Spring offensives were suspended and Domei and Sohyo-
affiliated private sector unions merged into the National 
Private Sector Union Council (Zenmin Rokyo) in 1982. Thereby, 
Sohyo lost its power base in the private sector. Moreover, its 
strongholds in the public sector were attacked by the government 
by way of decentralization and privatization of public services 
(e.g. the railways). 
 
Finally, a new confederation for the whole private sector was 
established in 1987 (the Japanese Private Sector Trade Union 
Federation, Rengo). Two years later, it absorbed Sohyo, whereby 
a new national centre of private and public sector unions came 
into reality. Rengo counted 78 industrial federations and 7,7 
million members, equal to 65% of all organized union members, 17 
% of all employees and 9 % of the voters (Tsujinaka 1992 p. 
200). Still, the new Rengo has no formal authority over the 
enterprise unions forming it's membership basis. Status quo is 
that enterprise unionism prevails. And yet, the more united 
Japanese trade union movement increasingly influence Japanese 
politics and society through its "osmotic networks" (Tsujinaka 
1992). It's long-standing president participated in political 
work, at first supporting the SDPJ and DSP, the non-LDP 
coalition governments, ending up initiating a new centrist -
conservative party (Williamson 1994 p.63-64). 
 
Summing up, it is suggested here that the ideological changes of 
the Japanese enterprise union movement evolved through the 
following periods, characterized by the dominant confederations 
and their mutual competition: 
 
1945-1950: Sanbetsu (political radicalism) 
1950-1962: Sohyo (militant economism) 
1962-1982: Sohyo/Domei (militant economism/company corporatism) 
1982-1989: Domei-Zenmin Rokyo (company corporatism) 
1989-    : Rengo (company corporatism and social reformism) 
 
The overall trend is towards enterprise based corporatism 
supplemented with social reformism at the political level. The 
decisive basis of unionism is the enterprise, and the company 
world provides enough issues and problems to split workers and 
unions along political ideologies and attitudes towards 
management. The Japanese enterprise union movement is not a 
monolithic unit, but a very diversified phenomenon. This said, 
Japanese enterprise unions seem to be dominated by the core 
labour force and white collar employees, excluding by and large 
temporary workers and contract workers together with employees 
in medium and small enterprises. 
 
 
 3.4. Organizational development and militancy 
Japanese enterprise unions have, from the early 1960s, 
consolidated their dominant position in the Japanese union 
movement, holding a share of 90% of all union members (table 5).  
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Table 5: Union membership in Japan 1930-1988 distributed along union types 
 1930 1947 1964 1975 1988 
Total union members in mio. (= 
100%) 
0.354 6.268 9.652 12.473 12.157 
Enterprise union members (%)    36    82   91    91   91 
Industrial union members (%)    46     6    5     5    4 
Craft union members (%)     7    10    1     1    3 
Other union members (%)    10     2    3     2    1 
 Source: Weinstein 1993 table 1 (also for notes on data) 
 
 
By international standards, Japanese workers are (1990) 
unionized at a medium level, above USA and France, equal to 
Holland and below Germany (BRD), UK and the Nordic countries 
(Williamson 1994 p. 310). Like US-unions, Japanese union density 
has also witnessed a long overall decline: from the peak in 1950 
(46.2% of private and public employees) down to 32.2% in 1960, 
up to 35.4 in 1970, down to 30.5 in 1982 and then falling 
steadily to 24.2% in 1993 (Tsuru & Rebitzer 1995 p.463; Shirai 
presents an organization ratio of 55.8% in 1949).  
 
During the years of economic fluctuation and recession (1970-
86/87) Japanese unions lost 7 percent points, the second largest 
loss among OECD countries, only surpassed by US unions with 14 
percent points. The UK-unions consolidated the overall level (-
1). Several national union movements performed well : Germany 
(BRD, +6), Belgium (+10), and some even very well: Sweden (+17) 
and Denmark (+29) (Blanchflower & Freeman 1992 p.59). 
 
The decline of Japanese union density does not directly parallel 
the decline of US-unionism. It fell 14 percent points during 
1950-60, and 6 percent points 1982-93, but rose anyway 3 percent 
points 1960-70. It's not a long steady declined from the 1950s 
like the US unions. Yet, a national enterprise based union 
system does not seem to prevent a negative trend in membership 
relative to the employee workforce. 
 
Japanese employees have a reputation of docility, low propensity 
to striking and other forms of industrial actions. Therborn 
(1984 p.16), relying on historical data from Shalev (1983), 
contends that the Japanese labour market is more militant than 
in the USA, West Germany and Scandinavian countries during the 
period from 1946-77 (measured as 'relative involvement', i.e. 
workers on strike per thousand of the non-agricultural labour 
force). From 1978-82 US employees (like Danish employees) 
surpass the Japanese employees, anyway. 
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Comparing patterns of strikes and disputes in Japan and USA, 
Ohtake & Tracy (1994) present contradictory figures. They find 
that the Japanese labour market has on average a much lower 
strike activity than the US during the period 1970-90. Working 
days lost per employees due to strikes and lockouts were half 
the US-level in 1972 and declined much faster in Japan than in 
USA later on, reaching the near-bottom in 1979 and the bottom in 
1988 (1994 p.349-50). In the manufacturing sector, 
strike/lockouts amounted, in Japan, to 4 per 1000 workers in 
1989 down to 3 in 1992, compared, in USA, to 143 in 1989 and 87 
in 1992 (ILO World Labour Report 1995 table VII p.118-119).   
 
Emphasizing that in the USA strikes only amount to 18% of all 
contract disputes, Ohtake & Tracy (1994) argue that 
strike/lockout activities do not catch the overall level and 
trends in disputes. Adding the hold-out, a normal practice 
during collective bargaining, to strikes the rate of disputes in 
contract negotiation increases up to 58% in the USA (1994 
p.350). In Japan, hold-outs during the Shunto are also common, 
involving refusal of overtime and holiday work. Using a measure, 
which is based on the number of bargaining units and counts 
dispute incidence including hold-outs in USA and Japan (here 
indicated by settlements of negotiations after 21 April), 
Japanese unions have a higher incidence of disputes, on average, 
than US bargaining units: 70% relative to 59%. The dispute rate 
was higher in Japan than USA during the 1970s while the reverse 
pattern was seen during the 1980s (1994 p.351). Yet, dispute 
duration and strike duration are lower in Japan than in USA.   
 
In sum, industrial relations disputes are common in Japan, but 
they seldom turning into strikes. Analysing the causes of the US 
and Japanese patterns, Ohtake & Tracy find that strike activity 
in the USA and Japan diverges in the way that protracted 
negotiations are related to macro uncertainty in Japan rather 
than industry uncertainty in USA. They conclude that the 
Japanese Joint Consultation System reduces the obstacles to 
reaching a settlement, compared to the asymmetric information 
bargaining framework in USA. Peaceful bargaining outcomes are 
also facilitated by the long-term employment system and the 
profit sharing system in Japan (1994 p.368).  
 
 
 
 3.5. Identity and power of Japanese enterprise unionism 
The decline of Japanese union density is addressed by Tsuru & 
Rebitzer (1995) who reject two of the main causes by which 
Goldfield explained the decline of US union density: 
 
  * The Japanese employers have not initiated an 
offensive against unionization as the US employers have. 
  * The Japanese industrial relation laws have not 
narrowed the space open for unionization, making unionization 
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much easier in Japan than in USA. 
 
The main explanation, according to Tsuru & Rebitzer, is that the 
enterprise unions have not been able to mobilize new membership. 
Why? The authors give the following reasons: 
 
  "First, Japanese unions have difficulty organizing 
new firms, and this difficulty cannot be attributed to the 
expansion of employment into previously non-union industries or 
occupations. Second, the direct effect of unions on wages and 
benefits in Japan is currently very small. Third, the absence of 
a union wage differential is likely to limit severely the 
attractiveness of unions to the non-union work-force. Non-union 
Japanese workers (particularly males) are interested in unions 
to the extent that they improve wages and working conditions. 
Fourth, Japanese unions do dramatically improve the ability of 
employees to 'voice' dissatisfaction on workplace issues. These 
voice effects may be very important in maintaining the high 
level of employee participation on which the Japanese system of 
production relies. However, analysis of exit propensities and 
job satisfaction indicators suggests that the additional 
employee 'voice' associated with unionization may not be highly 
valued by Japanese employees." (Tsuru & Rebitzer 1995 p.482). 
 
In sum, Tsuru & Rebitzer argue that the decline of Japanese 
union density is caused by lack of interest among non-union 
members to establish unions at new enterprises, and that the 
disincentive relates to the negligible impact of Japanese 
unionism on wage conditions, not to anti-union measures by 
employers and the authorities. 
 
This finding fits with Bernsteins opinion that dramatic shifts 
in unionization is part of a larger social upheaval, thereby 
changing the balance of class forces. This happened during the 
first decade after the Japanese defeat during the Pacific War 
1945. And it underline the weakness of enterprise unions 
concerning the unionization of new enterprises. Structural 
shifts in the economy will impact much more on Japanese union 
density than on US unionization. 
  
The questions of union identity and power remain. Do Japanese 
unions follow another agenda where employment security, for 
example, ranks above wage improvements? Do the Japanese unions 
have the power to effectuate their objectives?  
 
Analysing the relationship between economic restructuring and 
enterprise unionism in Japan since 1975, Deutschmann (1987 p. 
467) contends that the Japanese unions demand several conditions 
to be observed during reorganization of production (introduction 
of new technology, work reorganization etc): 
 
  1. Maintaining the level of employment 
  2. Improvement of quality of work 
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  3. Adequate training and reform of the training 
system 
  4. Improvement of safety and hygiene standards 
  5. Consultation of unions in advance 
  6. Fair distribution of the results of increased    
          productivity 
  7. Special support for elder workers 
  8. Shortening of working hours 
  9. Protection of the privacy of records kept on 
workers 
 
Deutschmann explains the high adaptability of unionized Japanese 
workplaces with the informal cooperation and consultations 
between the leaders of the unions, the upper management and the 
rank-and-file. The shop floor union leaders are indeed often the 
same people (lower management) who are in charge of the direct 
implementation. The unions secure steady employment, stable real 
wages and improved qualifications (for the union members i.e. 
the core permanent employees). The union identity is not 
violated as it can secure the main objectives without resorting 
to militant means. Actually, militancy declined in Japan in the 
same period where the industries were increasingly reorganized 
(after 1975). This trajectory is opposite to the US outcome 
especially during the 1980s where US militancy rose. 
 
Although recognizing that Japanese unions accomplished that the 
level of regular employment rose during restructuration, 
Deutschmann concludes that the Japanese unions are very weak. 
They did not achieve several important goals, and especially not 
a reduction of working hours.  
 
Deutschmann made his assessment in 1987 and was still right in 
1990: Japanese employees worked 2143 hours compared with 1769 in 
UK, 1904 in USA, 1648 in Germany, 1755 in France and 1776 in 
Italy (ILO World Labour Report 1992 table VI p.100-101; 
Williamson 1994 p. 307 cites slightly different figures and adds 
that the Japanese workers worked 1958 hours a year in 1992). 
South Korean wage earners worked slightly less than their 
Japanese colleges (2050, yet not for the year 1990). However, 
since 1990 Japanese workers have worked less hours per week in 
the manufacturing sector than their American colleges (ILO World 
Labour Report 1995). 
 
However, the cardinal interest - and labour effect, too - of 
Japanese enterprise unions seem to be employment security and 
employment expansion for the core (permanent) employees. How is 
this to be understood? 
 
The question of union employment effect is addressed by 
Weinstein (1992) arguing that oligopolistic Japanese firms and 
employees with enterprise unions are able to bargain collective 
agreements which are beneficial for both parties and 
simultaneously stimulate employment generation (and thereby 
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employment security).  
 
Weinstein contends that the conventional approach in labour 
economics is to treat unions and firms as contradicting parties: 
 
  The parameters defined by the production function 
and product demand functions determine the total revenues 
available, and the two parties must somehow come to an agreement 
over how these are to be divided" (Weinstein 1992 p.54). 
 
This assumption seems to be appropriate for the understanding of 
the US labour market, indicated by the fact that "unionized 
industries in the United States have higher wages, higher 
capital to labour ratios, and lower profits than similar non-
unionized industries" (Weinstein 1992 p. 54). 
 
Now, in the case of the Japanese labour market, Weinstein 
rejects the mainstream assumption. Comparing the Japanese and 
the US union structures and labour markets and applying the 
'efficient bargaining framework' of McDonald & Solow, Weinstein 
argues: 
 
  "that unless industrial unions place a high premium 
on employment, they have an incentive to reduce industry 
employment and output in order to generate monopoly rents that 
can be distributed to workers. Enterprise unions, however, 
cannot obtain monopoly rents by virtue of the fact that they can 
only sign contracts covering only the employees of one firm in 
the industry. This implies that enterprise unions will try to 
extract rents by conducting precisely the opposite behaviour: 
expanding the output of the firm in order to generate 
contractions in output by competing firms. Contracts covering 
only one firm in an industry will place more emphasis on 
maintaining high employment levels as a means to transforming 
labour from a marginal cost into a fixed cost. Since firms with 
lower marginal costs are likely to produce more in equilibrium, 
enterprise unions are likely to increase firm production" 
(Weinstein 1992 p.56). 
 
Moreover, Weinstein reaches the conclusion that Japanese 
collective agreements will be more stable than the US collective 
contracts as neither the management nor the enterprise unions in 
Japan have incentives to break it: 
 
  "Because enterprise unions in effect provide a 
commitment mechanism for firms to produce more, it can be shown 
that there will always exist an enterprise union contract that 
will raise the profitability of both the firm and the union. In 
general, this is not true for the industrial union. In that 
case, a firm can always be made better off by breaking a 
contract that is efficient for the union and the industry as a 
whole..." (Weinstein 1992 p.56-57). 
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In sum, Weinstein concludes that the 'united front' of 
management and unions in large Japanese companies does not 
spring from the weakness of the Japanese trade union movement, 
but from traditional optimizing behaviour. On the contrary, the 
Japanese trade union movement is weak because the union 
membership perceive the growth of their firm as more important 
for their welfare than the overall success of the trade unions.  
 
Finally, Weinstein argues that with the increasing 
internationalization of the US market and the decreasing power 
of US industrial unions, they will imitate Japanese enterprise 
unions more and more, not because enterprise unions are superior 
in traditional wage bargaining terms, but because the 
competitive situation of the US industry comes close to that of 
the Japanese industry. The US unions will increasingly give 
priority to job security and the union-management will start 
using job security strategically in the competition for market 
shares.  
 
Weinstein's argument is fascinating because it attacks holy 
cows, is based on controversial assumptions and outlines 
unexpected consequences. Being unable to assess the 
mathematically formulated theory, were are content with the 
criticism that the assumed production/employment scenario 
neglects the element of uncertainty and risk in market economies 
presuming that the rising output creates its own demand.  
 
In sum, Japanese enterprise unions do make a difference in terms 
of employment security, which is again essential for the members 
due to the dominance of the internal labour market in the 
Japanese unionized sector (larger firms). The employees are 
socialized and trained by the company into company specific 
skills. The wages are dependent to a large degree on experiences 
gained in the company and by the performance of the company 
(bonuses). External labour flexibility (retrenchment out of the 
business group) is the worst case of flexible adjustment to 
changing business conditions in the perspective of Japanese 
enterprise unions. The identity and power base of these unions 
are the company (group), and this company perspective is matched 
by the employers taking pride in company and employment 
expansion. Acknowledging the contributions and importance of the 
(core) workforce Japanese employers have pursued the 'high road' 
and done it successfully - in cooperation with the unions. 
 
In consequence, as Japanese big business prospered and 
employment was secured and expanded, union density declined 
while enterprise unionism remained the dominant type of Japanese 
unionism. 
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 4. ENTERPRISE UNIONS IN CONTEXTS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Section 4 starts outlining the politicization of labour unions 
during economic development. However, independent, militant and 
economistic enterprise unions became active in several 
developing countries in the 1970s. We will look into studies of 
enterprise unionism in Mexico, India, Malaysia and South Korea 
(hereafter Korea). Independent enterprise unions are minority 
labour organizations in Mexico, India and Malaysia. In Malaysia, 
the government supports the expansion of enterprise unions at 
the expense of industrial union. In Korea, enterprise unions 
were forced upon the labour force in 1980, at first controlled 
by the government-directed national trade union centre, but 
later on split into two centre, one of them being independent, 
democratic and illegal in its  search for national unionism. 
Labour unions are forbidden to take part in political activity 
in Malaysia and Korea, while they are politically involved in 
Mexico and India.  
 
 
 4.1. Political unionism and beyond 
Until the market oriented structural adjustments and 
transformations took place during the 1980s with 
commercialization and privatization of public sector activities 
in combination with liberalization and deregulation, the economy 
of developing countries was understood as political economy, 
featuring extensive state interventions and regulations or 
outright public ownership of productive assets and plan economy. 
 
Due to this context of politicized economies and political 
economic thinking, combined with the assumed weakness of plant 
based, fragmented or low density unionism, much theory on labour 
unionism focused on the political dimension of unionism (Bates 
1970). It was widely believed that Third World trade unions were 
much more politicized in their outlook and practice, either 
trying to influence party politics and governments to enhance 
the lot of workers ('political unionism') or being politicized 
by the state and subordinated as corporate bodies ('state 
corporatism'). Unions were not able to function in the 'normal' 
Western sense, either as economic agents bargaining over wages 
and working conditions, leaving politics aside (like US 
'business unionism'). Or acting as bargaining and conflict 
resolving organizations within an industrial relation system, 
while acknowledging a division of labour between various parts 
of the labour movement: labour unions, labour parties and 
eventually worker cooperatives and general labour education.  
This picture of political or state corporate unionism was 
challenged by the rise of new and militant forms of unionism 
subscribing to economism rather than politicism in capital-
labour relations of economic development during the 1970s. The 
new unions, labelled 'independent unionism', turned up to be 
independent enterprise unions. Why this outburst of enterprise 
unions? Was it effective? Did it change the course of the union 
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movement from national unions towards enterprise unions - 
instead of vice versa as hypothesized by Galenson & Odaka?  
 
Let us take a closer look at unionism in Mexico, India, Malaysia 
and Korea. 
 
 
 4.2. Independent unions in Mexico 
The Mexican union movement evolved with the industrialization 
during the 1930s and 1940s. This transformation of an 
agricultural country was lead by the state under the control of 
the single party in power, PRI. The home market was protected by 
the state (import substitution industrialization, ISI), and PRI 
developed a corporate system of control and incorporation of key 
social classes and organizations, including the Mexican trade 
unions. During the Cárdenas presidency (1934-40), the CTM was 
formed (1936) and had ever since been the dominant labour union 
centre, allied with PRI.  
 
However, the PRI-CTM regime did never achieve complete control 
over the Mexican workers and labour unions: 
 
  Insurgent movements have always been a feature of 
Mexican unionism. In the 1970s, however, they took on a new 
form. Previous union reform movements had generally been 
attempts by factional groups, or rank-and-file movements, to 
wrest control of the union from the incumbents. Now these were 
joined by a way of breakaway movements. The general pattern was 
for individual factories to secede from the official union and 
set up their own 'independent' union, independent in the sense 
that it was not affiliated with the official party or with the 
official union structure." (Roxborough 1984 p. 32). 
 
The independent unions mushroomed during the Echeverria 
presidency (1970-76) with the tacit support of the president, 
who aimed to reform the bureaucratic-authoritarian institutions 
of the Mexican society. In the end of the 1970s independent 
unions counted more than 100 unions within textiles, metal, 
automobile, rubber and food processing industries (Roxborough 
1984 p.33). Most joined the newly formed federations for 
independent unions (UOI).  
 
Emphasizing the lack of research on oppositional labour 
organizations and their impact on the politics of Mexico, 
Roxborough undertook a study of the automobile industry and its 
unions (3). Making 9 case studies of automotive manufacturing 
plants around Mexico City during the second half of the 1970s, 
Roxborough (1984) analyzed the hypothesized connection between 
independent unionism and wage improvements mediated by union 
militancy. He concluded anyway that his explanatory factor - 
PRI-union independence - did not fully explain the differences 
found neither in wage increases during 1973-80 nor in union 
militancy and other matters (see table 6 below). 
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Roxborough found an alternative and more consistent pattern 
between three core elements: union democracy (the explanatory 
factor), militancy (the mediating factor), and wage increases 
(the dependent factor). Other factors were influenced by and 
mediated the impact of union governance: union bureaucracy, 
employment security, conflict over work processes, and union 
control over work processes. The core factor was union  
 
Table 6: Roxborough's summary table (1984 p.156) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
democracy/oligarchy, not union independence/affiliation.  
 
Roxborough went a step further by explaining the formation of 
union democracy, too. Union democracy was established by a 
process of breakaway or gaining relative autonomy from the PRI 
controlled federations (CTM, CROC, COR). Originally unionized by 
CTM the automobile workers succeeded in transforming affiliation 
into independence by way of rank-and-file mobilization during 
the start up periods of the industrial enterprises. Moreover, 
the breakaway was conditioned by the strength and weakness of 
the regional structures of the federations in the particular 
industrial areas of auto plant locations (the Toluca area was 
tightly controlled by CTM). Two democratic unions were 
affiliated to corporate national unions (CTM and CROC) though 
while four non-democratic unions were fully or partly operating 
in Toluca. Finally, 'independent unions' affiliated to the 
labour centre of independent unions (UOI), securing a network of 
mutual support.  
 
Roxborough coined his argument by a simple model of the dynamics 
of industrial militancy: 
 
Figure 2: The dynamics of industrial militancy (1984 p.161) 
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Roxborough finalized his book after the outbreak of the Mexican 
debt crisis. His view on the future of Mexican independent 
unionism and the Mexican corporate political system is 
conditioned by this economic crisis and political initiatives 
taken by the government. Roxborough acknowledges that the rise 
of independent unionism became possible by PRI's more critical 
stance against the dominant PRI-union federation (CTM) during 
the presidency of Echeverria 1970-76. Since then PRI has not 
been sympathetic to independent unionism under President 
Portillo 1976-82, President la Madrid 1982-88 and President 
Salinas (1988-94). However, Roxborough did not foresee the fall 
of 'independent unionism': 
 
  "Although in the short run the economic crisis will 
undoubtedly hit hard at the independent unions, rank-and-file 
militancy is unlikely to disappear. In a diffuse and unorganized 
manner, such grass-roots insurgency will continue to weaken 
organized labour's ability to prop up the system." (Roxborough 
1984 p. 179). 
 
With hindsight we can ascertain that the new unionism did not 
succeed in strengthening themselves, expanding into and outside 
the manufacturing sector and finally reshuffling the dominant 
trade union structure (Zapata 1989). It did not even maintained 
its stronghold within the automobile industry (Carrillo 1995). 
Why? 
 
Roxborough's study is dominated by the union-state relationship. 
The union-employer relationship is deliberately downplayed or 
excluded from the analysis. Roxborough argued that neither did 
the management strategy seem to be important (e.g. the same 
company embraced both types of unionism in two different 
plants), nor did enterprise unions easily fell victims to 
management control. However, he did forecast that the upcoming 
relocation or expansion of automobile production in northern 
Mexico could start a new wave of union militancy and 
democratization among the autoworkers because the 'official 
unions' (affiliated to CTM, COR or CROC) were weak in these 
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areas (Roxborough 1984 p.157).  
 
Carrillo's study of the Mexican automobile industry (1995) 
rectifies the two missing links in Roxborough's study: the 
impact of management strategies and practices on the one hand, 
and the development of auto unions during the 1980s on the other 
hand. Carrillo focuses at the reorganization of Ford-Mexico, and 
he demonstrates that the changing production strategies of 
transnational companies in crisis-ridden Mexico had a tremendous 
impact on industrial relations. 
 
Carrillo delineates the double and concomitant shifts taken 
place during the 1980s: From import-substitution to export 
oriented industrial policies of the Mexican state, and from the 
'Fordist-Taylorist' home market production strategy towards the 
flexible world market production strategy among Ford-Mexico and 
other TNC auto producers. Simultaneously, the auto-companies 
closed down plants in the union strongholds of Central Mexico 
while expanding or building new plants in the northern non-
unionized areas of the Maquiladora or in areas of weak unions.   
 
Carrillo traces the overall transformation of the Mexican auto 
industry in the restructuring of three plants of Ford-Mexico. 
Ford went towards the American-style flexible production system 
(AFP), composed of Total Quality Control (TQC), Just-In-Time 
(JIT) methods, and the 'Californian' system of labour relations 
(non or weak unions, cheap migrant and first generation labour, 
individualized control and incentive systems) (Carrillo 1995 
p.88).  
 
At Ford-Mexico's old factory in Central Mexico (Ford-
Cuautitlán), described by Roxborough as having a democratic, 
militant plant union, the union fought the introduction of 
flexible production methods. It did so rather successfully until 
1987. The union had large leverage on the work process and the 
occupational structure, similar to the pattern of US unions' 
workplace control, and its identity was rooted in the workplace 
power. The transition to flexible production antagonized this 
power base and caused negative attitudes and resistance. The 
management overcame this resistance in 1987, when it took 
advantage of a strike over pay to closing down the factory, 
retrenching 3200 workers and only rehiring half the workforce at 
the time of reopening the plant. New labour contracts were 
introduced, reducing the differentiation in occupational 
categories and wage scales and changing the promotion criteria. 
Moreover, several tasks were privatized (canteen, cleaning, 
transport). All in all, management succeeded to gaining 
increased control over the work process, wages and the internal 
labour market. However, Ford did not broke the neck of the union 
and its militancy, nor did it manage to fully implement the 
flexible production system (leaving out team production, job 
rotation and upgrading of skill levels).  
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Carrillo concludes his case study of the old Ford-Mexico plant 
by noting that: 
 
  "Cuautitlán shows us that the major obstacle to 
implanting the AFP in an established plant is the construction 
of the social conditions which would allow its development, and 
in particular labour flexibility and a cooperative union." (1995 
p.96). 
   
Ford-Mexico did achieve the preconditions of a collaborative 
workforce and union at its new factory, Ford-Hermosillo, built 
in Northern Mexico near the US border. Here, the AFP was 
introduced too. Before opening the plant a new collective 
agreement was signed between the Ford-management and the 
dominant PRI-federation, CTM, which tried to improve its 
position in the auto industry by applying a new pro-business 
union policy. The union was counterbalanced in three ways: the 
employees at the plant elected their own union leaders; the 
management controlled  retrenchments, recruitment and training; 
and the work process was decentralized into autonomious work 
teams bypassing union influence.  
 
Finally, at the factory in the Maquiladora export processing 
zone (Ford-Favesa) Ford-Mexico faced no union resistance at all. 
No unions had been establish and management had already achieved 
much labour flexibility among a low skilled labour force. For 
Carrillo, the case of Ford-Favesa documented that the AFP can be 
introduced in a low-skilled, labour-intensive plant with high 
labour turnover rates, with partial adoption of flexible 
production methods and yet generating increased productivity and 
efficiency. 
 
One of Carrillo's overall conclusions concerns the relationship 
between industrial relations features and adoption of flexible 
production systems: 
 
  "The established plant at Cuautitlán required a deep 
restructuring of its labour relations system and a reversal of 
many of the gains made by the union since early 1970s. This 
provided a permanent source of conflict in the plant. The 
construction of a labour relations system which does not allows 
for any interference in management's use of flexibility seems to 
be the biggest problem facing plants on established sites. A 
union which is active however, and makes demands on management 
is not an absolute obstacle to JIT/TQC, as the Hermosillo case 
shows. The union sought to influence the way the AFP operated, 
but it did not oppose JIT/TQC with flexible working. On the 
contrary, the union believed that the system was better for 
workers and pressured for it to be applied more systematically 
and operated in a less Fordist manner." 
 
Carrillo's company case study from Mexico does indicate that 
labour can partly benefit from the shift to more advanced, 
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flexible production methods in the auto industry, when it choose 
to accept technological change and influence its implementation. 
While union power over the work process is reduced rank-and-file 
team groups may increase their autonomy of management (and the 
union). In the whole auto-industry the unions' power declined 
with the overall transformation of a home market-oriented, 
Fordist production system located in Central Mexico, towards an 
export-oriented flexible production system, relocated into 
Northern Mexico.      
 
 
 4.3. Internal unions in India 
The Bombay area had been a manufacturing centre for industry 
business in West India for decades (Bhattacherjee 1987; Helms & 
Danielsen 1988). During the 1960s the Bombay manufacturing 
sector changed from the older industries dominated 
by the cotton textile industry to newer mass production and 
processing industries of chemicals, petro-chemicals, 
pharmaceutical, electrical and electronics products. The old 
industries had been established during the era of 'national 
capitalism' while the new corporations were more diversified, 
less family controlled and more often controlled by foreign 
companies. Besides, the workforce of the new industries were 
typical younger, better educated and skilled, second generation 
workers, grown up in Bombay. 
 
Bombay unionism evolved with this changing framework of 
industrialization. The 1950s are known for 'responsible 
unionism', dominated by the state-and-Congress party-sponsored 
union, Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sabha (RMMS). Delimiting the 
communist unions rising power, RMMS got the exclusive right to 
collective bargaining within the textile industry. During the 
1960s, strikes, lockouts and 'labour-labour' conflicts increased 
between rivalling party-related unions (Congress, Communists, 
Socialists). Left wing oriented unions mobilized within the new 
industries and turned more and more to enterprise level 
negotiations, weakening state interventions in the wage settling 
processes. During the 1970s this enterprise-based movement 
combined with militancy at the plant level withdrew from 
political and corporate unions and sought inspiration and 
counselling from the regionally communal based party, Shiv Sena, 
and from external labour advisors, the most famous being Dr. 
Datta Samant, a former Congress politician. While Shiv Sena 
attacked the Communist, Datta Samant criticized Shiv Sena- and 
all other party-affiliated unions and called for industrial 
militancy. The rise of independent enterprise unions in Greater 
Bombay was strongly influenced by the ideology of Datta Samant 
('samantism'). 
    
Studying the new wave of Bombay unionism during the 1970s and 
early 80s, Bhattacherjee (1987) acknowledged the merits of 
Roxborough's research in Mexico. He situated his research within 
the same tradition while enlarging Roxborough's design by using 
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quantitative methods (a survey of 119 plant level collective 
agreements covering the period 1978-84, analyzed by means of 
statistical tests) and extending the industry coverage (from one 
industry to of several industries).  
 
Bhattacherjee defined independent enterprise unions as internal 
unions, controlled by the workers of the plant, contrasting them 
with external unions, directed by party-related industry based 
unions. His theory of internal/external unionism holds that  
 
  "the independent internal unions are more militant, 
and hence, more effective in securing higher pay and fringe 
benefits than the externally-affiliated unions." (Bhattacherjee 
1987 p.252). 
 
This relationship between union structure, militancy and 
wage/work conditions is mediated by the factor of leadership. 
Independent union leaders are workers themselves while external 
union leaders are appointed by high ranking officials of 
federations with political connections, thereby becoming 
political outsiders to the workplace rank-and-file. 
Bhattacherjee explains the wage effect in terms of bargaining 
and militancy: 
 
  "Worker negotiators from the internal independent 
unions, being more aware of shop floor issues and grievances, 
are probably more likely to engage in more militant bargaining 
simply because they have everything to gain by doing so, unlike 
the typical leader of the affiliated union whose salary is 
determined and administered by forces outside the enterprise." 
(Bhattecherjee 1987 p.253). 
 
Moreover, internal unionists are more exposed to membership 
pressure and accountable to the rank-and-file. 
 
The evidence from the Bombay study supports the theory, 
indicating a 15 per cent higher monthly wage pay on average 
among the internal union plant contracts than the externally 
negotiated plant contracts. The internal unions also showed 
better results in terms of annual bonus and other payments.  
 
Bhattacherjee controlled the results for additional factors like 
industry and local labour market effects, bargaining structure, 
and year of negotiating. Again, the independent unions performed 
better than the external unions.  
 
Finally, Bhattacherjee rejected the hypothesis that the better 
results were part of a deal whereby the management achieved 
higher autonomy, flexibility and productivity. On the contrary, 
he argued that management looked upon external unionists as 
being more responsible, that both type of unions seem to be 
equally forced to sign productivity clauses, and that internal 
unions broadened the scope of negotiations into issues 
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concerning workloads, hiring of temporary workers, deployment of 
employees, promotions, worker participation, maternity leave 
etc. Bhattacherjee, therefore, concluded that:  
 
  "The rise of the new independent plant-level unions 
since the mid-1970s in the Western Indian region has 
significantly curtailed managerial autonomy and flexibility" 
(1987 p. 261). 
 
Enterprise unions, embedded in the politicized context of West 
India, evolved into independent, democratic, militant and very 
effective in terms of bargaining wages and working conditions.  
 
At least for a period of time! With hindsight, the militancy 
backfired. 'Samantism' spread to the older industries and 
fuelled the long Samant-lead Bombay cotton textile strike 1982-
83. However, the strike was lost: many cotton mills were closed, 
moved, or rationalized, and many strikers returned to their jobs 
- or to their villages.  
 
Moreover, the new unionism started by rejecting conventional 
political unionism. But what happened? Datta Samant formed a 
labour party, won a seat in the Federal Parliament from a 
working class constituency in Bombay, and unified the new 
unionism behind his political bandwagon. The political circle 
closed again.  
 
In retrospective, 'Samantism' lost out to a more successful 
political-religious movement, Shiv Sena. In the mid-90s, Shiv 
Sena allied with the bigger Hindu party, BJP, and finally seized 
political power in Bombay renaming the metropolis into 'Mombay' 
following its Hindu ideology.  
 
During the 1980s various initiatives were taken to restructure 
and upgrade the Indian manufacturing sector. It finally broke 
through in the 1990s, partly forced into operation by external 
indebtedness and structural adjustment programmes. However, no 
studies of the response of enterprise unions to the drives for 
industrial reorganization are known to this author.  
 
 
 4.4. The case of Malaysian unionism      
Malaysia went through various phases of development and 
industrial policy. The etno-cultural riots in 1969 is one 
milestone in Malaysia, after gaining political independence in 
1957. They marked the transition to a pro-Bumiputera (Malays and 
indigenous people), state-led development policy, aiming at 
restructuring the economy away from etno-economic divisions 
between the Bumiputera majority and the Chinese and Indian 
minorities. They also marked a shift from import substitution 
policies in the 1960s towards export-oriented industrial 
policies in the 1970s, adding that the government favoured 
resource based industrialization in the early 1980s and shifted 
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towards liberal export oriented industrialization during the 
second half of the 1980s (Jomo & Edwards 1993; Standing 1993). 
In reality, export manufacturing became the leading source of 
growth only in the 1980s (Lim 1992). Overall, the Malaysian 
economy destabilized from 1979-84, went into a severe economic 
recession 1985-86 and regained its growth momentum from 1987 
onwards after the government, among other things, liberalized 
foreign direct investment and huge amounts of FDIs poured into 
Malaysia (Demery & Demery 1992). 
 
In 1982 the Mahathir-government announced its 'Look East' policy 
adopting Japan and South Korea as development models and turning 
the back against the British. While the 'Look East' policy was 
downplayed from the middle of the 1980s, one of its ingredients 
persisted: the promotion of enterprise unionism.  
 
In the Malaysian manufacturing sector enterprise unions already 
existed in newly established industries dominated by a few 
companies (e.g. steel), but they only counted a minority of 
union members. Industrial unions prevailed in manufacturing, 
while enterprise unions, delimited to departments and agencies, 
were the majority in the public sector. Enterprise unions 
numbered 48% of all unions in 1984 and went up to 57% in 1988, 
while they counted 26% of all private sector unions in 1984 
rising to 48% in 1988 (Ministry of Labour Malaysia 1983/84; 
1987/88) (4). In terms of membership, the share of enterprise 
unions amounted to 26% of all union members in 1984 up to 32% in 
1988; within the private sector, enterprise unions had only 7% 
of all union members in 1984 rising to 19% in 1988)(Ministry of 
Labour Malaysia op.cit.).  All in all, enterprise unions gained 
ground in Malaysia during 1984-88 and especially within the 
private sector. 
  
In 1988, ILO undertook a large survey of enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector of Peninsular Malaysia (the Malaysian 
Labour Flexibility Survey (MLFS), Standing 1991, 1992a, 1993). 
The survey provided a very large, differentiated and interesting 
material on several topics, including the impact of union/no-
union and industrial/enterprise unions during a period of 
economic recovery (1987-88) and touches upon the situation 
during economic recession (1985-86). The survey undertook 
structured questioning and direct interviewing with senior 
representatives of management in more than 2500 manufacturing 
companies in Peninsular Malaysia, achieving a response around 
80% (Standing 1993 p.74). 
 
Summing up the result by comparing non-unionized versus 
unionized firms, the survey indicates the following: non-
unionized companies have lower average earnings than unionized 
companies; higher wage differentials both in terms of 
skilled/unskilled and male/female ratios; lower probability of 
training new employees; less inclination to job rotation, work 
reorganization, technological change, and retrenchment, and 
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higher propensity to subcontract work. Finally, non-unionized 
companies showed lower productivity than unionized companies. 
 
Non-unionized companies lay in between firms with industrial 
unions and firms with enterprise unions in relation to product 
range extension in 1986-88; retrenchment firms doing rehiring, 
and rehiring at lower pay; and finally the ratio of labour cost 
relative to total production cost. 
 
The non-unionized workplace, then, seems to conceal some 
surprising facts, which are disappointing from the management 
point of view (the lower productivity level), and positive from 
the perspective of the production workers (higher employment 
security). Yet, non-unionized workers do not seem to enjoy an 
overall positive package of benefits relative to unionized 
workers, as the level of wages and earnings are significant 
lower, wage differentials higher, training is missing, rehiring 
at lower pay abounds etc.   
 
Contrasting firms with industrial versus enterprise unions, the 
overall trend indicates similarity as well as diversity. The two 
types of workplaces are close in terms of: average earnings; 
wage differentials based on skills; job rotation in largest 
companies; work reorganization; and technology change. 
 
The contrast is remarkable to the advantage of industrial 
unionized companies in terms of: higher wage levels; higher 
coverage of non-wage benefits for temporary workers; higher 
product range extension; higher rehiring by retrenchment firms 
and at lower pay; lower labour cost; and especially higher 
productivity. 
 
The enterprise unions are more successful in terms of: lower 
wage differentials between males/females (skilled as well as 
unskilled); training of new employees; job rotation (smaller 
firms); lower retrenchment; and rehiring workers at the same 
pay.   
Standing uses the survey to test two set of theories or 
approaches to unionism and development (see section 1.2). The 
first set concerns unionism versus non-unionism: The supply side 
perspective, and the dynamic efficiency perspective. Standing 
concludes that the survey supports the 'dynamic efficiency' 
theory of industrial unionism. 
 
The second set addresses the comparison between company unions 
and industrial unions, paralleling the Japanese approach to 
industrial relations and its critics: flexible unionism with 
dynamic efficiency versus agents of management or merely 
mediators, lacking experience, an independent power base and, 
hence, bargaining capacity (business effectiveness). Standing 
sides with the critics, interpreting the survey as supporting 
the criticism of company unions. 
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However, Standing's survey contains contradictory findings which 
can be reinterpreted. Two qualifications appear:  
 
  * it does only partly support the theory of union 
dynamic efficiency, limiting the efficiency to firms with 
industrial unions, and surprisingly not, to firms with 
enterprise unions (rejecting the Japanese model)!.  
 
  * the survey does support the hypothesis that 
unionized companies provides better wages and earning and less 
inequality than non-unionized workers. But the best total 
package of employee benefits is secured in firms with enterprise 
unions and not in companies with industrial unions (a reverse 
Japanese model)!  
 
These paradoxes are only understandable if we bypass Standing's 
conclusion and elaborate our analysis of the material and the 
premises of the survey: First, if higher productivity and lower 
labour costs are interdependent with higher retrenchment and 
rehiring at lower levels, then the dynamic efficiency seems to 
be, or could be, achieved by external flexibility (i.e. 
retrenchment and rehiring at lower pay). Moreover, the survey 
measures short term dynamic efficiency (2 years perspectives 
around 1988), not long term. By securing its workforce and even 
upgrading its skills and internal flexibility, firms with 
enterprise unions might pay the price in the short term, but 
gain in the long term when the demand pick up. Companies with 
enterprise unions might secure their workforce and, therefore,  
show better productivity and lower labour costs ahead (in the 
first half of the 1990s relative to the 1988 MLFS).   
 
Second, the differential impact of enterprise unions versus 
industrial unions might be interpreted as a matter of union 
bargaining strength and a correspondence between the strategies 
of management and the enterprise unions aiming at developing the 
productivity of the company to the mutual advantage of the 
counterparts. Standing's survey does not tell us anything about 
union strength, -government, or -militancy on the one hand, or 
about management policies and strategies on the other hand. 
Moreover, his analysis is based on the dubious premise that 
enterprise unions are 'company unions', i.e. dependent and weak 
unions. He outright adopts the US-biased term 'company union' 
instead of the more neutral 'enterprise union'. He explicitly 
talks about 'industrial (independent) unions' (1992a p.332), or 
industrial unions being 'more independent' than company unions 
'favoured by management' (1992a p. 333). Thereby, he assumes 
that management prefers enterprise unions and that enterprise 
unions are more submissive to management - without 
substantiating these hypotheses (in a study of the Philippine 
labour market, using the same survey method applied in the MLFS, 
Standing outright pools non-unionized firms and companies with 
enterprise unions (equalizing no union with enterprise union), 
setting them apart from firms with industry unions; 1992b p. 288 
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and table 9 p. 292). 
 
In sum, Standing is unable to interpret his own material because 
he assumes enterprise unions to be weak and dependent. The 
alternative interpretation of the 1988 MLFS is that it supports 
 the hypothesis: that industrial unions facilitate dynamic 
efficiency in the short term by means of external efficiency, 
while enterprise unions do allow internal labour flexibility 
without foreclosing dynamic efficiency in the long run, 
accomplishing a package of employee benefits in the short and 
probably also in the long run.  
 
Malaysian unions have been forbidden to partake in and support 
political parties since the 'emergency', i.e. the confrontation 
between the British colonial power and the communist-led unions 
and left-radical movement in 1948. The labour centres (MTUC and 
MLO) are allowed to join tripartite councils and function as 
'societies' (voicing the cause of labour) without having any 
collective bargaining power. The activities of the Malaysian 
unions have been delimited to the sphere of economics and their 
aims have focused at increased compensations and improved 
working conditions. In such settings of labour exclusion from 
party-political activity and corporate involvement, industrial 
unions shows (short term) 'dynamic efficiency' and enterprise 
unions generates labour effectiveness. Union wage effects turn 
out to be as great as the US union wage effects, 20-25%! 
 
This similarity between US and Malaysian industrial unionism 
might be related to the rather similar conditions for union 
recognition (secret ballots with majority criterium for 
recognition monitored by public authorities) and collective 
bargaining (often a national union versus a single employer). 
However, US unions have much more workplace power and much more 
space for collective actions. In Malaysia, strikes are in 
reality nearly impossible without the consent of the authorities 
(which is seldom provided), but there is room for industrial 
disputes evolving into mediation and arbitration. 
 
 
 4.5. Enterprise unions in South Korea 
Just as the Malaysian union structure, industrial unions 
dominated the Korean industrial relation scene during the 1960s 
and 1970s - with the all important difference that the national 
Korean unions were closely controlled and/or coopted by the 
military dictatorship and management.  
 
Enterprise unionism became the dominant legal form of labour 
unionism by 1980. Union locals of industrial (national) unions, 
controlled by the state, were transformed into local unions by 
way of prohibiting federations from assisting enterprise unions 
in collective bargaining (Kim 1993 p. 137). Thereby, the 
authorities tried to create a decentralized, company-
collaborating, politically fragmented and weak trade union 
 50
 
 
 
 
 
movement.  
 
It did work that way for a while. The union density fell from a 
peak about 25% in 1977 to 15% in mid 1987 (Kim 1993 p. 142 table 
5.2). But in 1987, political and social upheavals changed the 
politics of South Korea. The military dictatorship was forced to 
open up for multi-party elections and freeing the industrial 
relations system for external control. In a few years time, 
Korean enterprise unions launched a massive strike wave in 
favour of political reforms and economic concessions. New 
independent enterprise unions evolved and went for more radical 
and national forms of unionism. The old government-allied and 
lately revitalized labour centre (FKTU) got a rival national 
union centre (NATU) with members among independent (democratic) 
enterprise unions. Union density rose from 15.5% in 1986 to 
23.4% in 1989, and then declining again to 18.5% in 1992 (Jeong 
1995 p. 257 table 3). From 1986 to 1989 unionized establishments 
increased from 5% to 20% of all Korean establishments, with 
larger establishments (above 500 employees) reaching a level of 
about 80% (Wilkinson 1994 p. 110 table 3.17). The human rights 
attitude to union activity was reversed by 1989 when the 
government again started suppressing independent union activity 
and strikes (Jeong 1995 p.256; Kim 1993 p.159). 
 
The effectiveness of Korean unionism is difficult to assess. 
There seems to be a parallel between wage increases and labour 
mobilization. Overall real wages in all industries rose nearly 
7% on average 1982-87, went up to near 8% in 1988 and jumped to 
14,5% in 1989, the peak year of labour mobilization (in terms of 
membership expansion and strikes). The following two years, real 
wage increases fell to 10% in 1990 and down to 6% in 1991 
(Wilkinson 1994 p.110 table 3.18). Weekly working hours 
decreased in Korean manufacturing from near 55 to 51 in 1989 and 
45 in 1991 (Wilkinson 1994 p. 112 table 3.20). From 1986 to 
1990, nominal wages rose 100%, labour productivity 20% and unit 
labour costs 68% (Wilkinson 1994 p. 91 table 91). However, by 
1990 Korean hourly compensation costs of manufacturing 
production workers are still 26% of comparable US workers, the 
same level as Singaporean workers, a little higher than Hong 
Kong workers, a bit lower than Taiwanese workers, and much lower 
than Japanese workers (who earn 86% of the US worker) (Wilkinson 
1994 p. 90 table 3.10). 
 
The union wage effect has been estimated by official wages 
survey in 1987 and 1988 (random sampling of 60.000 employees; 
Kim 1993 p.154-56). For male non-production employees the gross 
wage differential (wages uncontrolled for skills, firm size etc) 
rose from 5½% in 1987 to 20% in 1988, and from 12% to 30% for 
male production workers. Net wage differentials (other factors 
controlled) for male non-production and production employees 
were below 3% (plus and minus) in both 1987 and 1988 (the same 
for female workers). The union wage effect varies also by 
industry, region, education and length of service. Finally, 
 51
 
 
 
 
 
unions have significant impact on wage inequality (Kim 1993 
p.156-57). 
 
Without direct measurements of union productivity effects, we 
may cautiously conclude that the rise of the militant and 
democratic union movement in 1987 and the overall revitalization 
of Korean unions caused rapid gains in real wages and working 
conditions. The Korean companies suffered with reduced labour 
cost efficiency, yet without being ousted by competitors in 
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The Korean unions almost 
catched up the backlog. 
 
Based on 6 case studies of Korean machine tool making firms 
1992-93, Jeong (1995) identified three characteristics of Korean 
enterprise unions. First, the coverage of these unions has been 
moulded by the size of the firms, which again reflects the size 
of the work force, the corporate culture of larger firms and the 
product market position of these firms. Moreover, the dependency 
on national unions varies with the development of industrial 
relations. 
 
Second, the destabilization of Korean industrial relations after 
1986 influences the structure and functions of enterprise 
unions.   
Third, Korean enterprise unions are distinct from Japanese 
enterprise unions. Federations of Japanese unions now deal with 
political issues more often than Korean unions. Moreover, Korean 
enterprise unions are based on blue collar workers and 
concentrate their bargaining capacity on improving wage and 
working conditions. Japanese unions are based on core 
productive, administrative and lower managerial employees and 
function as mediators between top management and rank-and-file, 
harmonizing the goals of the workers with the goals of the 
company. Finally, Korean unions are in flux towards more 
industry-wide and nation-wide coordination and cooperation. The 
Korean system of industrial relations have not yet found a 
stable order based on a compromise between labour, capital and 
the state. This has been achieved in Japan through a long 
evolutionary process, Jeong argues.  
 
What Jeong seems to overlook is that the historical development 
of Korean and Japanese enterprise unionism are more similar by 
its very constitution. Both Korean and Japanese enterprise 
unionism is born out of labour repressive, corporate 
nationalism, legally enforced by state power. Japanese 
enterprise unions evolved from the semi-fascist corporate 
structure outlawed by the US New Deal reformers (se section 
3.3.); Korean democratic unions rose out of semi-fascist 
corporate structures, too. The Japanese unions were taken over 
by moderate unionists with the support of management, state and 
US-occupation forces (the purge of radical elements), and they 
have kept and even enlarged their control of the union movement 
despite the existence of radical enterprise unions at the same 
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establishments. The Korean democratic unions do still face state 
oppression due to illegality of federal union interventionism 
and the offensive of business against militant unionism. The 
outcome of the ongoing struggle in South Korea is not yet 
determined, but it is worth remembering, on the one hand, that 
Korean unions never reached the same density level as Japanese 
unions, and, on the other hand, that Korean unions are rooted 
strongly among production workers and less influenced by 
administrative and managerial staff as the Japanese unions. This 
might be decisive in the long run, generating either a more 
industry or nation-wide union structure, or a more politically 
oriented union movement, based on democratic enterprise 
unionism. 
  
Another important feature of the Korean enterprise union system 
is its articulation with Korean industrial and development 
policy. South Korea is a new but already classic example of 
successful export oriented industrialization, based on a cheap, 
disciplined and hard working labour force, and large scale 
imports of foreign technology and capital under a 'development 
statist' regime directing big, family owned corporations into 
new export markets. The mobilization of labour power and capital 
for domestic investment is now part of the past and less 
competitive in the future. Korea faces increased global 
competition, both in product markets based on low cost 
production, and in high technology and capital product markets. 
Korea must increasingly enter the innovative stage of economic 
development (Porter 1990; Chowdhury & Islam 1993). This requires 
that the Korean 'chaboels' decentralize their management 
structures and change their personnel management. Finally, the 
intermingling of state-business affairs in Korea is now under 
attack by the new government under former dissident, president 
Kim Young Sam, pressuring companies to rely more on their own 
resources than on state support and protection.   
 
Finally, there may arise new cleavages between union members and 
union leaders on the one hand, and new consensus among 
management and the work force on the other hand, due to 
political and economic changes of the environment of the 
enterprise. A telling example is provided by Jeong: 
 
  "In the machinery firm B in the case study, top 
managers attempted to weaken the organizational base of the 
militant union by stressing the economically hard times faced by 
corporate management since 1990. Leaders in union B, despite 
their own sympathy with independent and political unionism, 
faced serious requests from their rank-and-file to accept the 
management's offer to guarantee job stability in return for 
disaffiliation from NATU. Encouraged by the new political 
environment, this managerial pressure was successful in forcing 
the union to disaffiliate from NATU in the Spring of 1993." 
(Jeong 1995 p.265). 
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 4.6. Enterprise unions and economic development 
Contrasting his own study of Malaysian unions with 
Bhattacherjee's study of Bombay unions, Standing thought that 
the divergent results might be caused by the divergent socio-
political context of unionism: the Indian unions tried to 
liberate themselves from party-political and governmental 
influence while the Malaysian unions were forced to concentrate 
on economic issues and claims.  
 
Reviewing the research of both Bhattacherjee and Standing, 
Edgren (1990) acknowledged the diametrically opposed findings. 
Edgren resolved their contradicting hypotheses by arguing that 
what really matters is the strength of union members, not the 
organizational structure in terms of enterprise-based or 
nationwide craft, industry or general unions: 
 
  "Unions which base their power on active 
participation of members will be effective regardless of their 
organisational form, while those which are based on the support 
of company management or political parties (not to mention the 
labour contracting union bosses of Bihar coalfields) will be 
siding with their patrons when conflicts of interest occur, and 
hence are likely to be less effective in the long run in 
protecting their members' interest." (Edgren 1990 p.645-646). 
 
Edgren did not include Roxborough's study, restricting himself 
to enterprises in Asia, but his equation between membership 
participation and bargaining strength corresponds very much with 
Roxborough's combination of union democracy and militancy. 
However, they do also slightly differ: bargaining strength is 
neither identical with participation because members may be 
mobilized in a populist way (without internal democracy) 
furthering the ends of the (charismatic) leader (which might 
include wage rises and work improvements). Nor is bargaining 
strength identical with strike militancy, as empowered 
bargainers may achieve their goals without resorting to strikes. 
Furthermore, union democracy does not necessarily lead to 
militancy as members are not per se militant. It depends very 
much on their perception of their position vis-a-vis other 
workers, the norms and values of the worker collective and the 
attitudes of management and public authorities. Employees may 
become increasingly angry about decreasing real wages, higher 
workloads etc., and they may act if they perceive the situation 
as very unjust, but refraining from taking industrial action if 
they perceive the outlook as bleak because the company and/or 
the whole economy is in very bad conditions.   
 
Recognizing the corresponding arguments of Edgren and 
Roxborough, it is thrilling to realize that Roxborough's 
interpretation of his Mexican multiple-case study is dubious. 
Using the 'qualitative comparative method' developed by Ragin 
(Ragin 1987, 1994), we can demonstrate that the dependent factor 
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(wage increases 1975-80) cannot be unambiguously determined, 
i.e. the same combination of explanatory factors equals both 
high and low wage increases (see table 7a and 7b in the 
appendices)! If we exclude unclearly defined dimensions and 
dimensions with data missing we can establish an explanation of 
union militancy (the appendices, table 7c), which says that 
union officials combined with work process control generate 
militancy, or that militancy is created by union autonomy 
combined with union officials. Union docility is conditioned by 
union affiliation to government related federations combined 
with no work control, or by no union autonomy combined with no 
union officials. In sum, our analytical problems are partly due 
to lack of information on key dimensions and the limited number 
of union cases. But the model for union wage effects does also 
seem to have a frame which is too narrow to accomplish a more 
comprehensive understanding, especially if we take into 
cosideration what happened during the 1980s. 
 
The theory and evidence on enterprise unionism and economic 
development present a complexity which cannot be disclosed 
without further studies incorporating other factors. First, the 
union-state relationship dominates the thinking of Roxborough 
(and partly Bhattacherjee) and the elder union-and-development 
research tradition to the point where the union-employer 
relationship is marginalized or totally excluded from the 
analysis. By example, Roxborough argues that management strategy 
seems to be unimportant as the same company witnesses two 
different types of unionism (official and independent) in two 
different plants of the same company.  No one of the 
'independent unionism' school argues that enterprise unions 
easily fell victim to management control. In contrast, Carrillo 
demonstrates the tremendous impact caused by the changing 
policies of transnational companies and the Mexican state during 
the 1980s. And Jeong shows how management is able to influence 
rank-and-file by underlining the hostile environment of the 
business.  
 
Authors like Roxborough and Bhattacherjee give prominence to 
union militancy as means for wage and work improvements. They 
see militancy as a precondition for the improvement of wages and 
work conditions. Anyway, Roxborough does recognize one anomaly 
where a non-militant union generates higher wages than other 
non-militant unions. He relates this deviant performance to the 
paternalist management of the company. Bhattacherjee, too, 
mentions that the militancy of 'samantism' spread to other 
industries and fuelled the long (and lost) Bombay cotton textile 
strike. Hence, militancy does not always deliver. Carrillo 
describes how one militant Mexican auto workers union is 
defeated by the Ford-management, yet without getting rid of 
industrial actions. The workers lost most of their gains from 
the past 1970s, but the management did not win the union 
cooperation and did not succeed by transforming the plant into a 
high productive factory. In fact, the struggles produced a 
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'lose-lose' situation.  
Nevertheless, in periods of socio-political upheavals, militancy 
may pay off, both in terms of increased union membership and in 
terms of real wage increases.  
 
The relationship between enterprise unionism and labour politics 
varies quite a lot in the different contexts considered. The 
independent Mexican unionism turned the back to the political 
establishment and went for economic gains and increased union 
and industrial democracy. They did not manage to change the 
course of Mexican labour during the economic crisis and 
structural changes. Nor did the Bombay new unionism under the 
leadership of Datta Samant. Samantism was not a winning formula 
for the Bombay textile strike, nor for successful local 
politics. Hindu nationalism took over as the alternative in the 
1990s. Malaysian unions are prohibited from participating in 
party politics and forced to concentrating on economic and 
workplace conditions. The most exciting prospect of a 
politically oriented strong labour movement is the rise of 
democratic unions in Korea since 1987.   
 
Finally, we have not been able to compare enterprise unions and 
industrial unions in a systematic way both at the enterprise, 
industry and national level. Roxborough did only study 
enterprise unions affiliated to either economistic or political-
corporate labour centres. Bhattacherjee did differentiate 
between internal independent plant unions and internal 
'employees' unions' (as opposed to external unions), but both 
performed equally well and much better than the external unions. 
These unions were nevertheless also related to the charismatic 
leadership of Datta Samant. Jeong's study was restricted to 
enterprise unions or non-unionized establishments. Standing's 
survey is the most elaborate both in terms of sample size and 
scope of analysis. The most surprising finding, critically 
reconsidering the material, is that enterprise unions seem to 
deliver a better deal for the employees (in terms of total 
benefits) while industrial unions generate 'dynamic efficiency', 
i.e. a win-win situation for management and employees. Our 
reinterpretation proposes that this paradoxical finding might be 
due to the short time perspective of the survey (plus minus two 
years), making enterprises with industry unions more adaptable 
to economic fluctuations by way of external labour flexibility, 
while enterprises with enterprise unions keep their workforce 
and pay the price in the short term, but not necessarily in the 
long term. 
 
In sum, enterprise unions develop and perform in a variety of 
ways during contexts of economic development, industrialization 
and industrial reorganization, economic recession and crisis, 
political transformation and cultural complexity. The evidence 
falsifies stereotypes of enterprise unions, either as backward, 
'yellow' unions without labour effectiveness or as vanguard, 
militant and democratic unions with labour effectiveness. Yet 
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independent enterprise unions do seem to be able to deliver 
considerable labour benefits in certain junctures while the 
information collected do not lent support for their business 
effectiveness or 'dynamic efficiency'. This conclusion questions 
the Western conception of enterprise unionism and economic 
development, disclosing the Galenson & Odaka theory as a myth.  
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 5. ENTERPRISE UNIONS: BACKWARD, VANGUARD AND NORMAL 
UNIONISM  
The preceding analysis of enterprise unions in disparate 
environments of industrial and industrializing structures and 
processes indicates the following contextualized conclusions: 
 
The various studies of US enterprise unions substantiate the 
view that enterprise unions were at first promoted by big 
business to counter rising militant and national unionism. When 
the unionization drive and/or the strike frequency slowed down, 
business support withered, enforced by employers' negative 
experiences with enterprise unions! The triple pressure from 
management, national unions and the New Deal administration 
crumbled the local unions. Many turned into 'union locals', 
probably contributing to the foundation of strong union locals 
within US national unionism. With the business offensive against 
all types of labour unions during the 1970s and 1980s, 
enterprise unions declined in line with national unions. The 
decline might be explained by the unique US union wage effect 
(relative to other OECD countries) combined with the strong 
union power at the workplace (job control)(evidence is 
inconclusive on US union productivity effect but conclusive in a 
negative direction about profitability effects).  
 
Being a minority of US unions, enterprise unions have 
nevertheless the capacity to deliver comparable labour benefits.  
US enterprise unions might gain strength and sometimes even 
their legitimacy by presenting an alternative to national 
unionism and no-unionism. In that sense they are free riders. On 
the other hand, they are squeezed by management's preference for 
no-unions, national unions priority for union locals instead of 
local unions, and labour laws curbing employees from 
establishing independent local unions. Their strength seems to 
be more democratic union government and closer contact with 
rank-and-file members. No research in USA has hitherto disclosed 
the enterprise union effect on productivity and profitability, 
and hence their 'dynamic efficiency'. 
     
Research on the Japanese national system of enterprise unions, a 
context free of 'free rider' options, substantiates that 
enterprise unions, based on the core workforce of production, 
lower management and administration, facilitate business 
productivity and national economic growth (the evidence on 
profitability is not conclusive, anyway). Japanese unions, like 
other Western unions except US unions, do not show any 
significant union wage effect. Real wages and earnings have 
improved but probably not as fast as productivity. Worse, union 
density declined during the 1950s after a tremendous social and 
union upheaval, and again since 1975. While the US decline can 
be explained by the combination of anti-union policies, the 
Japanese union decline seems to stem from the lack of employee 
interest, the restructuring of the economy and the inability of 
enterprise unions to assist employees unionizing new companies. 
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In sum: The particular Japanese 'welfare corporatism' or 
'business corporatism' has evolved due to concerted action of 
management, core employees and public authorities. The decisive 
factor might be the employment security generated by enterprise 
unions for core employees combined with the steady increase in 
compensation and skills. The vocational training provided by 
Japanese employers at the enterprise level (generating 
enterprise skills, not craft of general skills) socializes them 
into the company world and makes employees dependent on the 
internal labour market of the company. The declining militancy 
since the global recession from 1975 indicates a long term 
strategy of Japanese unions, acknowledging the primacy of 
permanent employment. The suspension of industrial actions in 
the 1980s has probably backfired by decreasing the visibility of 
union strength and initiatives, reducing employees motivation to 
become union members or even establish their own union in new 
plants. 
 
The rise of independent and militant enterprise unions in 
several developing countries during the 1970s presents a 
complementary scenario of enterprise unionism under conditions 
of politically regulated industrialization. Roxborough's study 
of Mexican auto plants analyses the breakaway and 
democratization of plant unions from corporate national union 
structures, underlining the important differences which arise 
between plant unions in a single industry, based on increased 
plant level autonomy, union democracy, employment security, work 
process control, union capacity and militancy. During the 1970s, 
the new democratic enterprise unions secured higher wage rises 
through militant practices than comparative non-democratic plant 
unions. However, the wave of independent unionism did not 
survive the economic recession and structural adjustment 
policies during the 1980s. Carrillo's analysis demonstrates how 
the auto unions became victimized by the combined efforts of the 
Mexican state's pro-business policy and the (transnational) auto 
companies' strategic shift from home market production to world 
market export. From an industry with strong, independent 
enterprise unions located in and around the capital (Mexico 
City), automobile companies relocated to the US-border areas, 
and/or introduced flexible production methods, turning the 
plants into non-unionized or weak union enterprises. The gains 
of the 1970s were more or less lost, but not necessary reaped by 
the employers in the old union strongholds due to ongoing 
industrial strife.   
 
The experiences of the new Indian militant economistic unionism 
is disclosed by the study of Bhattacherjee. It indicates that 
militant unionism, based on worker mobilization, may produce 
increased wages and improved work conditions in the short term. 
At the Bombay scene, militancy got out of hand during the 
textile strike and lockout in 1982-83. It accelerated into 
industrial warfare and ended in defeat. The independent unions 
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even became re-politicized, returning to the situation which 
formed the very counterpoint of the new union activists during 
the phase of establishing militant independent enterprise 
unions. It showed moreover that the new unionism did not provide 
a secure platform for successful political opposition in Bombay. 
It was delivered by Hindu nationalism triumphing in the 1990s.  
 
Looking into the structure and performance of Malaysian unions, 
facing government support for enterprise unionism since 1982 and 
beyond, Standing's study again supports the viewpoint that 
unions do matter very much in terms of workers' benefits, 
material and non-material. The union wage effect, identified 
only in USA, is also present in Malaysia (it cannot be estimated 
in the Mexico and India studies).  Moreover, while Malaysian 
industrial and enterprise unions deliver comparable benefits in 
many ways relative to non-unionized companies, their 
achievements differ in significant ways. Reconsidering 
Standing's argument that industrial unions secured 'dynamic 
efficiency', the material  indicates that industrial unionism 
deliver leaner benefits for the workers and more profitable 
gains for the employers. Employee benefits are more encompassing 
for the workers in enterprise unionized firms but the companies 
show less productivity and higher labour cost than firms with 
industrial unions. Standing surveys efficiency in a short term 
perspective. The efficiency results of companies with industrial 
union may simply be generated by their greater external labour 
flexibility (retrenchment, rehiring at lower pay). The 
disadvantages effectuated by enterprise unions may be offset in 
the long term, due to the prioritization of internal labour 
flexibility, human resource upgrading and the increased 
capability of the workforce.  
Finally, the course of South Korean enterprise unionism 
indicates the failure of the political top-down project to 
create collaborative, company oriented enterprise unions by 
legislation in 1980. Korean unions participated in the popular 
movement around 1987 which toppled the military dictatorship and 
opened the path to viable democratic politics in the 1990s. A 
new movement of democratic enterprise unions arose in the 
juncture of democratization and militancy 1987-89. The backlash 
from 1990 forced the radical union movement into retreat, but 
still at a higher level of mobilization than before 1987. The 
prospect of an industry-based or national coordinated union 
movement is favourable, depending on the development in 
employers' policies, labour legislation and the everyday 
struggle at the workplaces between corporative, cooperative and 
confrontational approaches to labour development. Based on blue 
collar workers in big industries, and faced with authoritarian 
employers and state agencies, Korean unions might very well take 
the paths of the old European or American national unions.  
 
The reconsideration of theories and evidence concerning 
enterprise unions in various societal contexts brings about 
controversial findings which ought to be incorporated in the 
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general analysis of unionism in advanced industrial settings as 
well as in developing economies. Enterprise unions are not 
necessary 'backward' in a worker perspective, or 'vanguard' in a 
management perspective, being management's lap dogs, securing 
low labour costs, productivity improvements and overall 'lean 
production'. They might as well turn out to be strong and 
militant unions with democratic union government, delivering 
employee benefits on a broad scale, at least in the short term.  
 
What makes enterprise unions 'backward', 'vanguard' or simply 
'normal' labour organizations are still open for research and 
debates. Their immanent weakness and docility have been 
disproved. They do not in the long run structure the 
contradictions of the workplace into cooperation at the premises 
of the management, as intended by US 'welfare capitalists' or 
foreseen by the Japanese model. They may deliver employment 
security, but not necessary fair deals compared with 
productivity increases (Japan). They may become radicalized, 
militant, democratic and labour effective, but unable to secure 
long term industrial democracy and labour development (Mexico, 
India, South Korea).  
 
The most interesting puzzle is the findings based on a 
reinterpretation of Standing's Malaysia Labour Flexibility 
Survey. Here, enterprise unions effectuated lower productivity, 
higher labour cost and relative better employee benefits 
compared with industrial unions. This finding contradicts the 
mainstream conception of enterprise unions, based on Japanese 
experiences, but not necessarily the findings from USA, Mexico, 
India and South Korea. We lack information on the labour and 
business effectiveness and overall 'dynamic efficiency' of 
enterprise unions to draw more firm conclusions regarding their 
consequences in terms of labour and economic development.  
 
The second most interesting puzzle is the structure, identity 
and dynamic (coverage, socio-cultural base, strengths, strategy) 
of enterprise unions. They may be initiated by employees in big 
enterprises in the early industrializing phases, or instigated 
and nursed by employers to resist national unionism, or formed 
by militant workers breaking away from state-corporatist 
structures and establishing militant and grass-root based 
unions. The long term course and outcomes (trajectory) is 
probably framed by three aspects: state labour policies and 
legislation; the business approach to workforce flexibility, 
training and unionization; and the socio-cultural basis of the 
union membership. Adding the overall societal juncture of social 
movements and upheavals. Hitherto development-oriented research 
approached enterprise unions (and labour unions in general) from 
a political or corporatist state/party/union perspective, 
neglecting the important employer-union relations of cooperation 
and conflict. Concomitantly, national systems of industrial 
relations have prevailed, ignoring the enterprise system of 
workplace relations.   
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Furthering the understanding of enterprise union effectiveness 
and dynamic efficiency in this triple (or quadruple) 
perspective, we have to elaborate the theoretical framework and 
continue the empirical research.  
 
The theoretical work may use Roxborough's model as the pivot, 
although it must be elaborated with historical sociology 
(Bernstein), comparative labour politics (Frenkel), comparative 
workplace analysis (Bélanger et.al. 1994) and integrative 
frameworks for industrial relations theory and human resource 
theory (Due et. al. 1992; Scheuer 1994; Clark 1995). Besides, 
Roxborough's model is weak in terms of the new industrial 
reorganization theory (Carrillo 1995; Humphrey 1995), and it 
lacks completely the decisive impact of management's strategies 
and personnel policies within larger business systems (Whitley 
1992). Finally, it should integrate the recognition of socio-
cultural diversity (Poole 1986; Salskov-Iversen 1993) with the 
notion of organizational culture and -identity. Thereby the 
model would encompass what seems to be very important if not 
decisive factors in enterprise relations systems of employers, 
employees and enterprise-level labour organization, operating in 
more and more deregulated and open, globalized economic 
environments (a preliminary framework is delineated in figure 3 
in the appendix).  
The empirical work is ongoing with a multiple-case study of 
enterprise unions in the manufacturing sector of Malaysia (Wad 
1994).    
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) The label 'yellow' is an invective used by dominant trade unions about 
unaffiliated and minor unions; a more neutral definition emphasizes that 'yellow' 
unions aim unsuccessfully to unionize significant groups of employees within the 
jurisdiction of established union; a more appropriate and up-to-date typology 
ought to differentiate between 'alternative unions' and 'niche unions' where the 
first category parallels the notion of 'yellow unions' while the second category 
do recognize the dominant labour centre (Scheuer 1990). 
(2) The modern debate on white collar unions articulated the same fundamental 
question raised in relation to 'company unions': what makes a labour organization 
into a genuin trade union? and not only into a personnel association or a 'yellow 
union'? (Scheuer 1996, personal communication).  
(3) John Humphrey, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK, 
made me aware of the relevance of Roxborough's very interesting and important 
study in relation to the problem area of enterprise unionism. 
(4) The figures refering to 1984 may in fact refer to either 1983 or 1985: the 
Registrar of the Trade Unions did not register the 1984 figures in the annual 
reports on specific unions, but the RTU might have calculated the aggregate 
numbers. The figures in Arudsothy & Littler 1993 table 4.6. differ slightly 
probably based on a misreading of the columns of percentages. 
